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Abstract
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have increasingly been used in military
application. The application in expanding scope of operations has pushed existing small
UAS beyond its designed capabilities. This resulted in frequent modifications or new
designs. A common requirement in modification or new design of small UAS is to
operate beyond visual Line-Of-Sight (LOS) of the ground pilot. Conventional military
development for small UAS adopts a design and built approach. Modification of small
Remote Control (RC) aircraft, using Commercial-Off-The Shelf (COTS) equipment,
offers a more economical alternative with the prospect of shorter development time
compared to conventional approach. This research seeks to establish and demonstrate an
architecture framework and design a prototype small UAS for operation beyond visual
LOS. The aim is to achieve an effective and reliable development approach that is
relevant to the military’s evolving requirements for small UASs. Key elements of the
architecture include Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), fail safe
design for loss of control or communication, power management, interface definition, and
configuration control to support varying onboard payloads. Flight test was conducted
which successfully demonstrated a control handoff between local and remote Ground
Station (GS) for beyond visual LOS operations.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE FOR
FLIGHT BEYOND VISUAL LINE-OF-SIGHT

I. Introduction

The Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is increasingly used in modern military
operations and this trend will continue to proliferate into the 21st century (Miller, 2013)
(Gertler, 2012:1). Sophisticated UASs such as Global Hawk (RQ-4) and Reaper (MQ-9)
are costly which discourages their use in operation where the risk of losing the platform
is high. Stepping up to fulfill these ‘dangerous and dirty’ operations is the small and
expendable UAS (Abatti, 2005). The small UASs are classified under Group 1 or 2
(Small Tactical) UASs and can weigh up to 55 lbs (Department of Defense, 2013:6).
Military systems are conventionally designed and built with strict performance
and reliability requirements. Consequently, it is generally more expensive than
Commercial-Off-The Shelf (COTS) system. The dollar per pound of the empty weight
cost of an UAS is estimated at $1,500/lbs (Department of Defense, 2002:33). This is the
cost to acquire a basic UAS that is operated by a ground pilot but has no other operational
capability. However, this relationship between cost (empty weight) and weight is not
linear for small UAS. Citing an example, the “Dragon Eye” weighs 3.5 lbs but the empty
weight cost is estimated at $35,000 (Department of Defense, 2002:33) (Sam PerloFreeman et al., 2014) . A similar size “Raven” that weighs 4.2 lbs has an empty weight
cost of $56,000 (Economist, 2011). Taking the official published cost of “Dragon Eye”
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the dollar per pound of the empty weight is $10,000/lbs. With decreasing military budget
in the projected future (Office of Management and Budget, 2015:59), there is an impetus
to seek a more austere approach to lower the acquisition cost of small UASs so as to
decrease the associated monetary value of losing the UAS during operation.
Conversion of a Remote Control (RC) aircraft models to small UAS, using COTS
equipments, offers an economical alternative to lower acquisition cost. This approach is
viable as small UAS with basic autonomous flying capability that cost less than $500
have been developed (Long Di and Chen, 2011:49, 73). The desired capability of the
UAS dictates the necessary payload which in turn determines the eventual size and cost.
Some examples of the capabilities (non-prescriptive) to facilitate ISR operation include
autonomous navigation, image recognition and night vision. A commonly required
capability is to operate the small UAS beyond visual Line-Of-Sight (LOS). This extends
the operating range of the UAS and reduces the danger of enemy attack on the GS.
The definition of LOS is having a clear path between the Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) and Ground Station (GS). This will enable wireless data to be transmitted
between two sub-systems (Gundlach, 1975: 472). The range of wireless transmission is
dependent on numerous factors. These include power level, signal frequency and
environmental signal noise (Gundlach, 1975: 475). The detail on the factors affecting
transmission range will be covered in Section 2.4.
LOS is lost when there is a blockage by terrain or when the operating distance is
so far that the curvature of earth prevents a straight line between the UAS and GS
(Gundlach, 1975:507). Due to the physical size, small UAS tend to be non observable

2

beyond relatively small distances without visual aiding equipment. In such instances the
UAS is operating beyond visual LOS even though there is still a clear wireless signal
LOS. In addition, operating a UAS designed for visual LOS beyond its intended range,
may also possibly exceed the transmission range of the system
This research incorporates COTS equipment on a RC aircraft. The aim is to
establish a framework to effectively and reliably develop a small UAS architecture that
has the capability to safely conduct operations beyond visual LOS. To ensure
airworthiness, the operating risks of the designed architecture are identified through
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to analyze its effect on Safety of
Flight (SOF). Corresponding mitigation such as fail safe designs and contingency
processes are subsequently implemented to address the risk. Thereafter, the residual risks
are re-assessed before implementation. To reduce development lead time, the UAS will
be based on a readily available small electric RC aircraft, “SIG Rascal 110”, as the
platform for the research. Finally, the framework to develop the system architecture will
also encompass the regulatory requirements to operate the UAS.

1.1

Problem Statement
New military systems can be acquired either through COTS or developed from

new based on requirements. Civil regulation in the United States currently restricts
operation of the small UAS to within visual LOS. With no commercial motivation, COTS
UASs are consequently not often developed to operate beyond visual LOS. Some
military-developed small UASs have operating ranges that exceed visual LOS. However,
they are generally more expensive as they have to meet stringent specifications.
3

The normal mode of system acquisition with design and build cannot fulfill the
new operating paradigm of the small UAS requirement in term of cost and functionality.
To overcome this shortfall, a modified mode of acquisition to develop small UAS from
COTS equipment is studied.
1.2

Objective
This research aims to (1) develop the architecture of a small UAS that is capable

of operating up to five times the visual LOS range through the use of COTS equipment,
(2) establish a framework and document the development process so that it can be
effectively and reliably repeated across other small UAS in AFIT research and (3)
validate SOF of the designed architecture and seek airworthiness approval for flight
testing. The architecture can potentially be applied to existing or new UAS research such
as cooperative flight with multi-UASs or autonomous target recognition with the aim to
fulfill the need for small UAS that are economical and expendable in military operations.
1.3

Investigative Questions
The investigative questions for this research are;
i.

What are the requirements for a framework to effectively and reliably repeat
the capability to operate beyond visual LOS on other small UASs?

ii.

What COTS components are required in a small UAS architecture to operate
beyond visual LOS and how is the architecture integrated and validated?

iii.

What are the hazards associated with beyond visual LOS operation and how
can they be mitigated to achieve airworthiness approval?

4

1.4

Scope and Assumptions
The scope of this research is to establish and demonstrate the system architecture

and design a prototype small UAS for the proof of concept to operate beyond visual LOS.
This architecture will be portable to other platforms within the Group 1 or 2 UASs. A
framework will be used to organize the development so that the process can be
effectively and reliably repeated on other small UASs to operate beyond visual LOS.
To reduce development lead time, a readily available “SIG Rascal 110” will be
used as the platform to seek airworthiness approval. The SOF assessment will be based
on the FMECA of potential risk of the architecture and its corresponding mitigations. In
the premise of this research, there will be a clear LOS (no blockage) for wireless signal
between the UAV and the ground pilot. However, the research will also validate the
approach to possible exceedance of transmission range associated with beyond visual
LOS operation. This will be simulated by reducing the level of transmission power within
the UAV and the GS. The design will be validated through progressive test flight to
achieve the desired distance.
1.5

Methodology
The first part of this research focuses on the approach to address the investigative

question. The second part of this research proceeds to identify the system specification
and functional requirement for a UAS to operate beyond visual LOS. The system
architecture will subsequently be integrated through test and validation.
The third part of the research will focus on mitigating the risks identified in the
architecture through the use of the FMECA and establish the Bill of Material (BOM). In
5

the last part, the result from the test architecture will be analyzed and a final hazard
assessment will be conducted before seeking acceptance of the residual risk.
1.6

Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 and 3 of the research cover the Literature Review and Methodology.

The Literature Review chapter presents the background knowledge essential for this
thesis. This includes classification of UAS, regulatory requirement for UAS operation,
Budget Link analysis for signal transmission and the FMECA process. The chapter also
presents related research on UAS architecture that extends operating range and/or
improves flight control and safety. The Methodology chapter explains the approach to
address the investigative question. It will also consolidate the requirements and processes
to develop the system and build a framework which can be referenced for similar
development in the future.
The next two chapters describe how the architecture was developed and how the
hazard analysis was conducted. Chapter 4 includes the selection of key components,
development of the physical architecture through FMECA and a hazard analysis of the
designed system. The chapter will conclude with a BOM of the demonstrated
architecture. Testing and verification results will be captured and analyzed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 concludes this research with proposal for potential future work based on the
insights gained.
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II. Literature Review

Chapter 2 presents the background knowledge required to complete this thesis.
The first portion defines the classification of military UAS and the necessary regulations
that prescribes the requirements to operate an UAS beyond visual LOS. This is followed
by the explanation on the FMECA process and Budget Link Analysis which was
employed to ensure airworthiness of the system architecture. The second portion of this
chapter describes research related to UAS architecture that extends operating range
and/or improves flight control and safety.
2.1

Classification of Military UAS
The classification of the UAS is related to this research as it defines the system

and performance specifications that set the boundary of this research. UAS are generally
classified according to their weight and operating profile (Department of Defense, 2013;
Ministry of Defence, 2010). However, the structure of classification and quantitative
specification differs between different organizations. Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrates the
UAS classification between two established Armed Forces, the United States Air Force
(USAF) and the United Kingdom Royal Air Force (RAF) respectively. The comparison
and application of the two classifications to define the requirements for the system design
will be carried out in Chapter 3 of this research.

7

Figure 1. Classification of UAS by USAF (Department of Defense, 2013)

Table 1. Classification of UAS by RAF (Ministry of Defence, 2010)

8

2.2

Airworthiness Requirement for UAS
This section of the chapter covers the regulatory requirement on airworthiness for

the conduct of flight test to validate the designed architecture.
2.2.1

Civil Airworthiness Requirement

The US civil regulatory requirement mandates a documented airworthiness
approval by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) for an aircraft, manned and
unmanned, to ensure that “it conforms to its type design and is in a condition for safe
operation” (Code of Federal Regulation, 2011:14.21.1, 124).
The approval document is in the form of an Airworthiness Certificate. However,
the existing certification requirement in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), Title 14
Chapter 21, was originally published for manned aircraft and the stringent requirements
could not be fully complied by UAS (Maddalon et al., 2013:5). The FAA has submitted a
proposed regulation with the aim to better integrate UAS into the National Air Space
(Department of Transport, 2015). There is a section in the proposal that addresses the
current deficiency in UAS certification requirements. Consequently, the research has to
reference the proposed regulation to ensure that the system design fulfills relevant
ensuing requirements.
Currently, the FAA only issues Special Airworthiness Certificates for UAS
conducting 1) Research and Development, 2) Crew Training and 3) Market Survey
(Department of Transport, 2015: 2,4). This research is focused on the UAS architecture
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and not the development of a specific UAS design. Hence, a special airworthiness
certificate from the FAA is not necessary.
To ensure airworthiness of the UAS in general, the FAA has implemented an
interim airworthiness approval process. This interim approval process is in the form of a
Certification of Approval (COA) and is determined by the UAS’s intended use. UAS
operated by individuals solely for recreational purposes are termed as model aircraft and
will comply with regulations from its community based organization (United State
Congress, 2012:77). When the intended use deviates from recreational purpose, such as
public or civil applications, a FAA-issued COA is required for any operation within the
National Air Space (Department of Transport, 2014). This requirement is also extended
to commercial purposes.
The expected flight test to validate the system design is part of the research
conducted under the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). This placed the intended
use under civil application. Consequently, a COA from the FAA is required for the test
flight if it is conducted in the National Air Space. However, in the scope of this research,
the test flights will be conducted in military controlled air space. Hence, a military
approval instead of a COA is required.

10

2.2.2

Military Airworthiness Requirement

The Department of Defense (DoD) prescribes it airworthiness requirement in
MIL-HDBK-516C, where it defines airworthiness as “the property of a particular air
system configuration to safely attain, sustain, and terminate flight in accordance with the
approved usage limits” (Department of Defense, 2008).
The USAF acknowledges that not all of its aircraft will be able to fully comply
with the stringent airworthiness requirements stipulated in MIL-HDBK-516C
(Department of Air Force, 2010). For these aircrafts, airworthiness was ensured through a
Flight Release on a case by case basis (Department of Air Force, 2011). Hence, small
UASs would normally be operated under a Military Flight Release (MFR).
The MFR is required for all USAF’s small UASs prior to any flight regardless if it
is to be flown in military controlled airspace or National Air Space. As an institution,
AFIT has an internal Technical and Safety Review Board (TRB/SRB) to accept the
residual risks associated with the flight test of an UAS with a valid MFR (Air Force
Institute of Technology, 2014). Formal acceptance of the residual risk is recorded through
the AFIT Document 5028. The TRB/SRB will be convened prior to each test flight.
In summary, to conduct a UAS test flight, regulatory approval must first be
sought through a MFR. Thereafter, the residual risk of the system design in a flight test
will be approved by the AFIT TRB/SRB. If the flight is conducted outside military
controlled airspace, a COA is required.

11

2.3

Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis
FMECA is a reliability evaluation technique which examines the potential failure

modes within a system and its equipment in order to determine the effects on equipment
and system performance. Each potential failure mode is classified according to its impact
on mission success and personnel/equipment safety. The FMECA is composed of two
separate analyses, the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and the Critical
Analysis (CA) (Department of Defense, 1993).
The MIL-STD-1629 (Department of Defense, 1980) that prescribes the FMECA
process for the DoD was rescinded in 1984. However, the procedure was generally
carried forth and remained widely employed during the development process to ensure
reliability of military and industry systems (Department of Defense, 1993). The
indicative procedure in MIL-STD-1629 comprised of five major tasks.
i.

Perform FMEA to identify effect of item failure on system operation and classify
each potential failure according to its severity.

ii.

Perform CA to rank each potential failure mode identified in the FMEA according
to combined influence of severity classification and its probability of occurrence.

iii.

Document procedure for performing FMECA-Maintainability Analysis. This
supplies the criteria for Maintenance Planning Analysis, Logistic Support
Analysis and identifies maintainability design features that require corrective
action.

iv.

Document the procedure for performing a Damage Mode and Effects Analysis.
This provides early criteria for survivability and vulnerability assessments.
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v.

Document the procedure for developing a FMECA plan for contractors’
compliance.
A comprehensive FMECA would include all five tasks prescribed in MIL-STD-1629.

However, the research only seeks to develop the UAS architecture and does not aim to
produce a system to be fielded for actual operation. Hence, the focus will only be on the
first two tasks which analyze the potential failure modes and its impact to mission
success.
2.4

Link Budget Analysis
Similar to manned aircrafts, UAS are operated in three modes, “Manual”,

“Assisted Fly-By-Wire” (commonly known as “Stabilized”) or “Autonomous”. The key
difference is the presence of an onboard Auto-Pilot (AP) computer in the second and
third mode. The majority of UASs use Radio Frequency (RF) to transmit data wirelessly
(Gundlach, 1975: 472) for all 3 modes of operation. These data include telemetry on
(generally) health and status, payload data, and Command and Control (C2) data. Proper
control of the UAS depends on uninterrupted RF communication between the UAV and
GS.
The “SIG Rascal 110” was designed for operation within visual LOS. Extending
the range beyond visual LOS requires an analysis to verify that the RF communication
link between the air vehicle and the GS remains uninterrupted. Link budget is the primary
communication system analysis tool used to determine whether the communication will
be reliable (Gundlach, 1975: 475). The signal strength measured at the receiver is
expressed as below (Gundlach, 1975: 476).
13

Si = PT GT LT LP GR LR (4𝜋𝑅))2
𝜆

Si =
PT =
GT =
LT =
Lp =
GR =
LR =
λ=
R=

(1)

Signal Strength
Transmitter Power
Transmitter antenna gain
Transmitter loss
Propagation loss
Receiver antenna gain
Receiver losses
Wavelength of carrier signal
Separation distance

Converting the Equation (1) for received signal strength to decibel (dB), and
rearranging them based on separation distance, the following equation (Gundlach, 1975:
483) is derived:

R< 100.05[EIRP – Psensitivity + Lp,Atm + Lp,Precip – 20log10(fMhz) + 20log10(0.3/4π) + GR + LR - LM ]

(2)

R = Range (Km)
EIRP = Effective Isotropic radiate Power
= PT + GT + LT (dBm)

(3)

PSensitivity = Receiver sensitivity (dBm)
Lp,Atm = Propagation loss to atmosphere absorption (dB)
Lp,Precip = Propagation loss to precipitation absorption (dB)
20log10(fMhz)+ 20log10(

0.3
4𝜋

)=

Free space loss

GR(dbi) = Receiver antenna gain (dBi)
LR(db) = Receiver losses (dB)
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(4)

Lm = Link margin (dB)
PT = Transmitter Power (dBm)
GT = Transmitter antenna gain (dBi)
LT = Transmitter loss (dB)

The maximum range is determined by four components, 1) Transmission, 2)
Propagation, 3) Reception and 4) Link Margin. Transmission is measured in terms of
EIRP and is comprised of transmitted power, transmitter antenna gain, and losses within
the transmission system. Propagation loss is attributed to the environment and
combination of losses due to free space, atmospheric absorption and precipitation
absorption. The reception is determined by the sensitivity of the receiver antenna,
receiver antenna gain and losses within the receiver system. Lastly, Link Margin is
introduced to buffer real-time variation in the signal-to-noise ratio.
2.4.1

Electric Field Strength Conversion

Radiated emission can be described by many means. One of the ways to describe
radiated emission is through the electric field strength measured at some distance from
the radiators. Understanding of the electric field strength is important as the emission
limit in the regulation (Code of Federal Regulation, 2009; 810) is prescribed in this mean.
Electric field strength is measured with the following equation (Ghasemi et al., 2012;40);

E = √30 ∗ 𝑃
𝐷

(5)
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E = Electric field strength (V/m)
P = Transmitted power (W)
= PT * GT

(6)

D = Distance (m)

2.5

Related Research
This thesis referred to a series of research that are related to the architecture

design of a small UAS. Beyond LOS operation of small UAS has been explored using
means of relay nodes to maintain the RF communication link around an obstacle (Seibert
et al., 2010). Although the aim is not the same as this research, the system architecture
from the earlier effort can potentially be adopted to extend the range to safely operate the
UAS beyond visual LOS.
In the mentioned research, a second UAS was used to relay the telemetry and
image data from the primary UAS to the GS. The relay UAS is configured slightly
differently from the primary UAS, such that, it does not have a camera system but is
installed with an additional modem and image data receiver. The image data receiver was
a modified from the image data transmitter by adding a form factor receiver.
C2 data, including telemetry data, for the AP computer is transmitted in the 915
MHz frequency band with 1 W power. Due to a limitation in the hardware, the relay UAS
receives the C2 data link from the primary UAS though one modem and thereafter relays
it from another modem that is operating in a different channel. The dual modem on the
relay UAS was subsequently reduced to one with availability of new and more capable
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modem hardware. The telemetry Image data is transmitted in the 2.4 GHz frequency band
and 1 W power. It is similarly received through a receiver and relay through another
transmitter operating in a different channel.
Key components in the architecture include the “Virtual Cockpit” software which
provides the user interface for the operators on the ground with the “KestrelTM autopilot”
on board the UAV. The C2 data link is initially transmitted through the “DIGI XTend®”
modem which was subsequently replaced by the more capable “MICROHARD” modem.
Image data is received by the “Yellow Jacket” receiver on the ground. However,
additional detail on the airborne transmitter was not documented.
As a follow-on to the research in 2010, the same architecture was modified to
incorporate autonomous cooperative control on the relay UAS (Shuck, 2013). The
architecture was also extended from the original UAV platform, “OWL”, to a larger “SIG
Rascal 110”. The new architecture was developed with changes to several of the key
components. The “Yellow Jacket” receiver for image data were retained but the user
interface software has been changed to “Mission Planner”. The onboard AP has also
been changed to “Ardupilot Mega autopilot”. The frequency for the C2 data link
remained in the 915MHz band using the “DIGI XBee-Pro® 900” with 50mW power. The
Image data link was transmitted from the UAV through a 600 mW transmitter in 5.8
GHz.
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2.5.1

Autopilot Computer

The general working principle of a COTS AP computer was explained in a
research where an AP computer was designed for a small UAS (Christiansen. 2004;
Seibert et al., 2010). The researcher explained the working principles of the AP in
maintaining a stabilized flight towards a set coordinate way point. This mode of operation
that does not involve active input of flight control command by the ground operators is
called autonomous flight.
Flight heading and profile towards set waypoints are maintained and/or corrected
by the AP computer by controlling the motor and servos. Control signals for the servo
and motor are generated through the Proportion-Integral-Derivative (PID) feedback
controller function in AP computer with inputs from the various sensors and GPS signal.
The enhanced understanding on the AP computer board helps to better identify the failure
mode and its effect on the system architecture although the same component may not be
employed.
In this research, the “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected. The aforementioned AP
computer shares the same developer as the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” and was based on
the firmware and software of the latter (3DR, nd). The “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected
as it offers more capabilities over its predecessors. These include dual power supply,
more accurate position estimation and redundant sensors. At the same time, application
knowledge with the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” from earlier research can also be
employed due to similarity of firmware and software.
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2.5.2

Mission Planning Software

The mission planning software provides user interface and translates mission
plans into correct actions to be executed by the Air Vehicle. Basic mission plan are waypoints and flight profile that the Ground Operator prescribes for the Air Vehicle.
Application and operation knowledge on “Mission Planner” has been gained through
recent research. In particular, knowledge in integration with flight simulation software
and “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” has facilitated Hardware in the Loop testing of flight
under laboratory condition.
2.5.3

RF Transceivers

The theoretical range of the RF C2 data link with the “MICROHARD” modem at
1 W transmission power was calculated to approximately 4.3 km (14,000 ft) (Seibert et
al., 2010). With the same transmission power of 1W, the “RFD 900+” modem was
reviewed for this research. The “RFD 900+” possesses several features that were not
available on the modems used in earlier research. These include spread spectrum
frequency hopping, dual diversity (two antennas) and network capability between
multiple modems. The added features may potentially be exploited to enhance the
transmission in a given range or increase it beyond what was calculated in earlier
research.

19

2.5.4

Long Range Flights

The “SIG Rascal 110” has been successfully flown in an earlier AFIT research to
develop autonomous flight (Jodeh, 2006) but was conducted within visual LOS. The
tested system architecture of the design will form the basis in this research where it is
reviewed and further improved through a FMECA.
Recreational application of Small UAS has been known to transcend visual LOS
through First Person View (FPV) operation beyond a range of 40 km (Team BlackSheep,
2010; Montiel, 2011). The system setup for the recreational models that were discussed
in online forums was also referenced during the development of the architecture. It is
noteworthy to highlight that this research did study if the recreational FPV that operated
beyond visual LOS has obtained the relevant regulatory approval.
A key characteristic of long range FPV flights is the use of low frequencies to
increase the range. For FPV operation at 43 km, the RC data link was communicated with
the “EzUHF 433MHz” transceiver system at 600 mW and the Image data link was
broadcasted in 2.4 Ghz at 500 mW (Team BlackSheep, 2010). The range of 55 km was
achieved with the “Thomas Scherrer LRS” transceiver system which also communicates
in 433 MHz but at a power of 500 mW. The Image data link was broadcasted at 1.3 GHz
frequency with 1.5 W (Montiel, 2011).
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2.6

Summary
In this chapter, the background knowledge required to complete this thesis was

discussed. The UAS classification which prescribes the performance and system
specifications was presented. This was followed by an elaboration of regulatory
requirement to test a UAS in flight. Thereafter, the FMECA process and the Link Budget
analysis used in the research were explained. Lastly, the research on related efforts to this
thesis revealed that previous works shared some common functionality. However, there is
no similar work with the aim of developing the architecture of a small UAS that can
operate beyond visual LOS using COTS components.
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III. Methodology

Chapter 3 delves into the approach to answer the investigative question in the
research. The research framework was developed through the use of System Engineering
methods. Thereafter, the framework is employed to address the two remaining questions
on designing the architecture and analyzing the hazards to validate the SOF of the UAS.
3.1

Research Framework
A Framework is defined as “a document that describes useful methods, practices

and procedures for developing Architecture Descriptions. …, it involves a structured tool,
methodology, interconnections and standardization that guide what to produce and how
to construct them” (Ford, 2014).
The DoD System Engineering Process (SEP) is applied iteratively, adding
additional detail and definition with each application (Department of Defense, 2015). In a
project development, several SEPs are employed in parallel across the development for
each subsystem and thereafter vertically throughout the development to integrate the
subsystems. The scale of development for this research is relatively small; hence, a single
SEP is adequate. This section of the chapter discusses how the DoD SEP was adopted to
create a framework for the conduct of this research. The aim is to document the research
process so that it can be reproducible in future applications.
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Figure 2. DoD System Engineering Process (Department of Defense, 2015)

Figure 3. Adaption of DoD System Engineering Process
The process is initiated after the identification of a Need, see Figure 2. In Step 1,
an Analysis of Requirement is conducted to define the requirements of the ‘solution’
system that will fulfill the identified Need. In Step 2, the defined Requirements are
translated into functions. This is done through a Functional Analysis on what the
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‘solution’ system needs to carry out. In Step 3, the functional architecture developed from
the preceding level is synthesized into a physical system. Step 4 is will seek approval for
the design and thereafter validate it though flight test. The process finally ends with the
application of a new MFR to operate beyond visual LOS. Figure 3 maps the adaption of
the DoD System Engineering Process to this research.
Figure 4 illustrates the complete framework that was used for this research.
Development on the system architecture begins after the requirements to fulfill the needs
identified in Section 1.1 are defined. The needs are, to develop a UAS that is 1) small in
size, 2) operates beyond visual LOS and 3) is low in cost. Objective 1 and 2 will be
translated into requirements after the specification are defined in Chapter 4. Objective 3
will be quantified at the end of Chapter 4 and compared against a same size UAV using
the empty weight cost of the “Dragon Eye”.
Specification to the requirement in terms of size and operating profile is based on
the classification to military UAS. This will be elaborated in Chapter 4 of the research.
The empty weight cost of the designed system will also be compared against the
published cost of the “Dragon Eye” system to establish the relative affordability in the
event that the system is lost in an operation.
The remaining investigative questions of this research are associated with the
architecture and air worthiness validation of the system. In the development framework
for this research, these correspond to the three elements in the Functional Analysis and
Allocation level. Hence, emphasis was placed on the details of the three elements in that
level and is documented in the following section of this chapter.
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Figure 4: Development Framework for UAS to Operate Beyond Visual LOS
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3.2

System Architecture Development
Architecture is defined as “fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its

environment embodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its design
and evolution” (ISO/IEC/IEEE, nd). Documenting the architecture of the designed
system as part of the research framework will facilitate future application or
modification.
Development on the system architecture begins after the requirements to fulfill
the identified needs have been defined. These requirements are then translated into
functions and allocated to the three major sub-systems of the UAS. The allocated
functions are subsequently decomposed until it can be performed by a physical
component. Thereafter, testing and evaluation are carried out to ensure the multitude of
components is properly integrated.
An earlier research effort in AFIT has successfully developed, and autonomously
flown a “SIG Rascal 110” UAV (Jodeh, 2006). Figure 5 shows the system architecture
developed in the previous research effort. However, it is observed that the documented
architecture focused only on the communication linkage and was incomplete as a system
with key components such as the motor not being included in the diagram. Available failsafes are also not documented in the architecture definition. Hence, a new architecture
has to be designed for this research.
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Figure 5. Communication Architecture of Autonomous “SIG Rascal 110” (Jodeh, 2006)
The functional requirements of the system are allocated to sub-systems in the
designed architecture and progressively decomposed until a physical component can be
assigned. This research aims to develop a comprehensive architecture that encapsulates
all the components in the design. In addition, it will also document the relationship
between the components by indentifying all the information and resource flowing
between the component interfaces. Tests will be conducted to verify component
capabilities that are critical in fulfilling the defined requirements. One such example is
the verification to ensure that the system can operate in an increased range that is beyond
visual LOS.
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3.3

Risk Management
Risk is the potential for a negative future reality that may or may not happen. It is

defined by the probability of occurrence and the consequences of occurrence
(Department of Defense, 2001: 133). Risk management is the organized method to
identify and measure, thereafter to handle the risk. (Department of Defense, 2001: 134).
Similar to the system architecture, documenting the risk management process as part of
the research framework will facilitate future application or modification.
Past UAS research efforts in AFIT were focused on the technical development of
new capabilities and did not conduct a FMECA for the risk analysis on their systems
(Jodeh, 2006; Seibert et al., 2010; Shuck, 2013). In addition, operating beyond visual
LOS has considerations that may not be applicable in normal visual LOS operation. The
architecture shown in Figure 5 has a dual redundancy on the wireless control input to the
aircraft. However, it is evident that the relay switch will be the single point of failure to
all the servos in the system. The consequence associated with the relay switch failure has
to be analyzed to determine if it is acceptable when the aircraft is operated beyond visual
LOS.
The recursive risk management approach carried out in this research to ensure
airworthiness of the system is shown in figure 4. The potential hazards of the system
architecture are evaluated through the use of FMECA where the outcome of possible
failure mode of each component is analyzed. Mitigations through design improvement
and contingency procedures were subsequently put in place to reduce the probability or
consequence of occurrence. With the design improvement and procedural mitigations in
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place, a final risk assessment is conducted to assess if the residual risk is within
acceptable level.
3.4

Incremental Flight Testing
As part of the risk management approach, key functions of the designed system

are individually validated through flight testing. This is carried out using the existing
MFR to operate a “SIG Rascal 110” UAS within LOS. After finalizing the design, an
initial flight test will be carried out to test the key features. Thereafter, progressive testing
will be designed to gradually increase the range of the flight test until it achieves the
requirement to operate beyond visual LOS. The latter flight tests will not be carried out
due to constraints on the research duration.
3.5

Design Approval
Following the final risk assessment, the system architecture will be compiled with

the operating procedures as a part of the Safety Plan which will be reviewed by AFIT’s
TRB/SRB for approval. Following AFIT’s endorsement, the designed system will be
submitted for COA and MFR approval.
3.6

Summary
This chapter described the framework that will be used to develop a small UAS

that can be operated beyond visual LOS. A risk analysis will be conducted on the system
architecture before it is submitted, together with the operating procedures, for approval.
The documented framework and system architecture can be applied to facilitate efficient
reproducibility of this development for future research.
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IV. System Architecture and Risk Management

Following the processes illustrated in Figure 4, Chapter 4 begins by defining the
specification that determines the requirements for the system architecture. This is
followed by the development of the system architecture together with the risk
management process to ensure airworthiness
4.1

Specification of Requirements
The specification of the requirements in terms of weight and operating profile

used in the research were referenced to existing UAS classification in USAF and RAF.
Adaptations were made to customize the specification from the two classifications.
4.1.1

Weight Requirement

Table 2 summarizes the difference in the weight classification of the UAS
between the USAF and RAF that was previously illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1
respectively.
Table 2. Classification of UAS Weight in USAF and RAF
Weight [lbs]
< 4.4
< 20
< 44
< 55
< 330
< 1,320

USAF
Group 1

RAF
Micro

Micro/Mini

Group 2

Small Tactical

Group 3

Tactical

Group 4

Persistent

Group 5

Penetrating

Class I

Mini
Small

Class II

> 1320

Class III
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Tactical
Medium Altitude Long
Endurance
High Altitude Long
Endurance
Strike/Combat

The size of a UAS is associated with its weight in both the USAF and RAF
classifications. However, there are notable differences between the two classifications for
UAS that weigh below 330 lbs. The USAF classification of a ‘small’ (tactical) UAS
weighs less than 55 lbs while the classification of ‘small’ UAS in RAF can weigh up to
330 lbs (150 kg).
This research aims to develop a small UAS that can be operated beyond visual
LOS, but at the same time, is inexpensive so that it is expendable in an operation. Hence,
the comparatively lower weight limit, and its corresponding cost, of the ‘small’ UAS in
the USAF’s classification make it more appropriate for the scope of this research. The
maximum weight of the USAF’s Group 2 Small Tactical UAS is 55 lbs with an estimated
empty weight cost up to $550,000. However, the Group 2 Small Tactical UAS in the
USAF classification does not adequately differentiate the limit at the lower end of the
weight range. The lower weight limit of Group 2 small UAS at 21 lbs is relatively high.
Consequently, the minimum weight of 4.4 lbs from the RAF Class I Mini UAS
classification was integrated to the USAF Group 2 UAS in the weight specification for
this research. This adaptation also recognizes the need of micro technology that is
required for miniature UAS which separates its development from the small UAS.
In summary, the applicable weight range for this architecture is between 4.4 to 55
lbs. This weight range is also consistent with the FAA’s definition of small UAS
(Department of Transport, 2015). The empty weight of “SIG Rascal 110” is 11 lbs and is
appropriate to serve as the base platform in this research.
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4.1.2

Operating Profile Requirement

The UAS classification in the USAF and RAF was previously illustrated in Figure
1 and Table 1 respectively. Table 3 and Table 4 summarized the difference in altitude and
operating range of the established Air Forces.

Table 3. Classification of UAS Operating Altitude in USAF and RAF
Altitude [ft]
< 200
< 1,200
< 3,000
< 3,500
< 5,000
< 10,000
< 18,000
< 45,000
< 65,000

USAF
Group 1

RAF
Micro

Micro/Mini

Group 2

Small Tactical

Group 3 & 4

Tactical/
Persistent

Mini

Class I

Small
Class II

Tactical
Medium altitude Long Endurance

Group 5

Class III

Penetrating

High altitude Long Endurance
Strike/Combat

Table 4. Classification of UAS Operating Range in RAF
Range [km]
5 km (16,400 ft)
LOS 1
25 km (82,000 ft)
LOS
50 km (164,000 ft)
LOS
200 km (656,000 ft)
LOS
Unlimited
Beyond LOS
Unlimited
Beyond LOS
Unlimited
Beyond LOS

RAF
Class I
Class II
Class III

Micro
Mini
Small
Tactical
Medium Altitude Long Endurance
High Altitude Long Endurance
Strike/Combat

From the two tables, it is observed that the operating profile is directly related to
the weight of the UAS. From Table 3, the maximum operating altitude, for the identified
USAF Group 2 UAS is 3,500 ft above sea level. However, the operating range for the
1

The definition of LOS in the RAF classification is RF LOS and not visual LOS.
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USAF UAS classification was not published. The operating range is published in the
RAF classification, but it is referenced to RF LOS and not visual LOS. Hence, it cannot
be adopted directly.
From previous research, the “SIG Rascal 110” can be safely operated in “Manual
mode” at a distance of 1,000 ft (≈ 305 m) at an altitude of 200 ft without visual aid.
Visual LOS can be maintained up to a distance of 2,000 ft (≈ 610 m) when operating in
“Autonomous mode”. The “SIG Rascal 110” weighs 11 lbs and has a wing span of 9.2 ft
(SIG Rascal Specification, nd). Depending on size, the distance is increased if a larger
UAV is employed. For this research, the target was set to extend the range, to five times
that of visual LOS, up to 10,000 ft (≈ 3,050 m). A safety factor of 30 % was further
added into the target which brings the range to 13,000 ft (≈ 4 km).
4.2

System Architecture Development
In this section, the functional requirements of the system are identified and

allocated to various sub-systems of the architecture to be designed. Thereafter, the
functional allocation is progressively broken down until physical components can be
assigned to fulfill requirements.
4.2.1

Identifying and Allocating System Functional Requirements

A typical UAS setup (Shuck, 2013:32; Diamond et al., 2009:66; Seibert et al.,
2010:38) was adopted for the research. This setup includes an Air Vehicle, a Ground
Station and Ground Operators. See Figure 6 for typical setup.
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Figure 6: Allocation of System Functional Requirements
In the setup, Ground Operators will conduct mission planning and upload the
mission plans into the GS. Thereafter, they will control the UAS from the GS. In
addition, the Ground Operators will also be responsible for executing established
operating procedures in the event of a contingency.
The GS receives mission plans, processes them into command signals and
transmits it to the Air Vehicle. Simultaneously, it receives telemetry data from the Air
Vehicle, processes and displays them to the Ground Operators. This data is also stored for
future reference. The functional allocation for the GS is decomposed in the Figure 7.

Figure 7: Allocation of System Function for GS
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The Air Vehicle will carry the mission payload and fly towards the designated
waypoints while monitoring essential onboard data. It transmits telemetry and image data
to the GS for monitoring while simultaneously receiving command signals from the GS.
Lastly, the Air Vehicle must be capable of receiving GPS signal to establish the system’s
geographic location. The decomposed functional allocation for the Air Vehicle is
illustrated in Figure 8

Figure 8: Allocation of System Function for Air Vehicle
4.2.2

Assigning Components to Allocated Function

COTS components were assigned to fulfill the decomposed functions for the
subsystems in Figure 7 and Figure 8. See following table for assignment of components
to decomposed functional requirement. Key components are evaluated in the next section
to ensure that the assigned components can fulfill the allocated functional requirement.
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Table 5. Component Assignment for Allocated Functions
Sub System
2.2
GS

2.3

3.1

3.2
Air
Vehicle
3.3

3.4

4.2.3

2.1
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
3.1.1
3.1.2.1
3.1.2 3.1.2.1
3.1.2.1
3.1.3
3.2.1.1
3.2.1
3.2.1.2
3.2.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.2.2
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.5
3.6
3.7

Functional Requirement
Receive Mission Plan
Receive Image Data
Receive Telemetry Data
Transmit Command Data
Update Mission Plan
Process Data
Display Data
Store Data
Provide Power
Generate Thrust
Control Speed
Control Heading
Control Altitude
Navigate to Way Points
Transmit Image Data
Transmit Telemetry Data
Receive Command Data
Receive Mission Plan
Updates
Monitor Power Status
Monitor GS Comms Link
Receive GPS Data
Monitor Flight Parameter
Measure Heading
Measure Air Speed
Measure Altitude
Capture Image
Provide Power
Establish Geo Location

Component Assigned
Laptop
RF Transceiver
RF Transceiver
RF Transceiver
RF Transceiver
Mission Planning Software
Laptop
Laptop
Lithium Battery
Motor + Propeller
Electronic Speed Controller
Servos to Flight Control Surface
Servos to Flight Control Surface
AP Computer
RF Transceiver
RF Transceiver
RF Transceiver
RF Transceiver
AP Computer
AP Computer
AP Computer
AP Computer
Magnetic Compass
Pitot-Static Sensor
GPS
Camera System
Lithium Polymer Battery
GPS

Evaluation of Components

Key components for the functional allocation are 1) Mission Planning Software,
2) RF Transceiver, and 3) AP Computer. The mission planning software and AP
computer influence the overall system capability while the RF transceiver determines the
operating range. Evaluation was conducted on these three components to ensure that the
designed system meets the specified requirement in terms of range and SOF.
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COTS RC aircraft can be procured at different stages of assembly, ranging from
bare fuselage to Ready-to-Fly kit. With a bare fuselage kit, the suppliers would readily
recommend the minimum specifications for the basic components on the air vehicle.
These recommendations include sizing of the servos (torque requirement), motor (power
requirement) and propeller (pitch and diameter requirement). For Ready-to-Fly kit these
basic components are packaged with the fuselage. In this research, the basic components
were selected based on previously flown “SIG Rascal 110” in earlier AFIT research.
Consequently, evaluation of these three components was not required.
Battery size is related to voltage and amperage capacity. The required battery size
is dependent, in part, on the voltage requirement of the motor and intended duration of
the system. This research will only ensure that the selected battery can supply the
required voltage to safely drive the motor. Specific amperage capacity of the battery is
not established as operating duration may change as different missions require. This will
be determined separately after the mission is defined. The research will instead measure
the rate of amperage utilization to provide a baseline to scale the battery capacity
according to the desired duration for future application. This will be documented in
Chapter 5.
GPS, magnetic compass and the pitot-static sensor have singular functions unlike
the mission planning software and AP computer. In addition, differences in specifications
for these components will only affect the accuracy in the geo-location, air speed and
altitude of the air vehicle which do not have a direct impact on the capability, unlike the
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RF transceiver. Hence, compatible pitot-static sensor and GPS with integrated magnetic
compass are taken from COTS selection without detailed evaluation.
Mission Planning Software
Central to the GS is the software that can translate mission plans into correct
actions to be executed by the Air Vehicle. Basic mission plans consists of way-points and
flight profiles that the Ground Operators prescribe for the Air Vehicle. Several models of
COTS software are available in the market that can fulfill this function. Earlier research
conducted in AFIT achieved autonomous UAS flight by employing either “Mission
Planner” (Shuck, 2013:26; Seibert et al., 2010:164) or “Virtual Cockpit” (Diamond et al.,
2009:66).
“Mission Planner” will be adopted for this research as it is used in more recent
research and more importantly, it is compatible with “Pixhawk autopilot”. Care was
taken when interfacing the selected software and hardware. “Mission Planner” is only
compatible with Windows Operating System. Hence, the accompanying laptop in the GS
must be running on the Windows Operating System. In addition, configuration
management should also be maintained for the software versioning of “Mission Planner”
as a new version may not be fully backward compatible with the flight firmware in the
autopilot computer.
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RF Transceiver
Wireless transmission is achieved by modulating the data onto a high frequency
carrier signal. A transceiver system is comprised of a modem and an antenna which
transmits and receives modulated signals at the same time.
Based on the Link Budget Analysis in Section 2.4, transceiver frequency and
power output are two of the factors that determine the transmission range. The spectrum
usage for radio frequency is regulated and differs between countries. Considerations have
to be taken in selecting the legal frequency spectrum that will be used for various
functions on the UAS. In the USA, RF spectrum usage is regulated by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Prior to selection, the
frequency of the intended transceiver should be verified against the Code of Federal
Regulation for restrictions (Code of Federal Regulation, 2009: 808) and Spectrum
Allocation Chart by NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, 2011) for possible interference.
Apart from frequency usage, the transmission power is also regulated to reduce
interfaces to users of the electromagnetic spectrum (Code of Federal Regulation, 2009:
810). The following table shows the regulated limits to the transmission power at various
frequencies.
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Table 6: Limits of Transmission Power at Various Frequencies (CFR, 2009: 810)
Frequency (MHz)
0.009 – 0.49
0.49 – 1.705
1.705 – 30
30 – 88
88 – 216
216 – 960
Above 960

Field Strength (μV/m)
2,400/F (kHz)
2,400/F (kHz)
30
100
150
200
500

Measurement Distance (m)
300
30
30
3
3
3
3

Using Equation (5), the corresponding limit to transmission power at 216 to 960
MHz is 12 mW and above 960 MHz is 75 mW. Beyond the regulated limit, additional
provisions apply to the transmission device. The Table 7 is an abstract of the additional
provisions that are applicable to the various frequencies mentioned in this thesis (Code of
Federal Regulation, 2009).
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Table 7: Additional Provision on Transmitting Device Beyond Regulated Power Limit
Frequency

Power

410 – 470
(MHz)

30 + 6
(dB)

902 – 928
(MHz)

1,000
(mW)

1.24 – 1.3
(GHz)

40 + 6
(dB)

2.4 – 2.435
(GHz)

1,000
(mW)

5.725 –
5.85 (GHz)

1,000
(mW)

Remarks
-For intermittent control signals, maximum transmitter power is
30 dBm with antenna gain of 6 dBi.
-For continuous transmission, maximum transmission power is
12 mW.
-Applicable to spread spectrum transmitter with minimum of 50
channel hopping capability and digitally modulated transmitter.
-Maximum transmission power is reduced to 250 mW if channel
hopping is between than 49 to 25 channels.
-For intermittent control signals, maximum transmitter power is
40 dBm with antenna gain of 6 dBi.
-For continuous transmission, maximum transmission power is
75 mW.
-Applicable to spread spectrum transmitter with minimum of 75
channel hopping capability and digitally modulated transmitter.
-Maximum transmission power is reduced to 125 mW if channel
hopping is less than 75 channels.
-At maximum transmission power, use of directional antenna is
permitted with power reduction. For every 3dBi gain in antenna,
transmission power must be reduced by 1 dB.
-Applicable to spread spectrum transmitter and digital
modulation.

The functional decomposition has identified three categories of data to be
transmitted or received; Image, Command and Telemetry. The Command and Telemetry
data are commonly categorized together as the Command and Control (C2) data link.
This link generally requires lower data transmission rate in the range of 50-200 kbps
(Gundlach, 1975:500). Image data on the other hand requires a much higher data
transmission rate ranging from 250-450 kbps (Riiser et al., 2012:24,9). Although the C2
data link is less demanding, it is more critical compared to the image data link. To avoid
RF interference, the two data links are separated using different frequency spectrums.
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From Nyquist’s theory, the rate of data transmission is dependent on the available
bandwidth which the RF signals are broadcast in. Higher data rate requires larger
bandwidth. From Section 2.5, three ranges of transmission frequency were used in earlier
research. They were, 915 MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz. The 915 MHz band has
consistently been used for the C2 data link in earlier research and will similarly be
adopted for this thesis. The allowable bandwidth for spread spectrum transmission in the
2.4 GHz frequency range is 83.5 MHz Federal (Federal Communications Commission,
1996: 20-21). For the 5.8 GHz frequency range, the allowable bandwidth is 125 MHz.
Hence, for possible higher data rate, the 5.8 GHz was selected for Image data link
(Federal Communications Commission, 1996: 22-23).
From Section 2.5.4, model aircraft that have achieved a range of 40 km operated
in lower RF frequency for the C2 data link at 433 MHz. However, it is not necessary to
adopt the same frequency as the maximum expected range of the research is not as far.
Earlier research has already shown that a 915 MHz modem at 1 W transmission power is
capable of reaching 4.3 km (14,000 ft) (Seibert et al., 2010).
For the preliminary architecture, the “RFD900+” transceiver and a set of
“Aomway 5.8 GHz” transmitter and receiver were identified for the C2 and image data
link, respectively. The former operates at a mean frequency of 915 Mhz bandwidth with a
transmission power of 1,000 mW (RFD 900, nd). The latter operates at a mean frequency
of 5.8 Ghz with a transmission power of 1,000 mW (Aomway, nd). Operating range of
the transceiver/transmitter was estimated through theoretical analysis with Equation (2)
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for the Link Budget Analysis and is shown in Table 8. The system’s gains, losses and
sensitivity in the table were estimated (Jacques et al., 2015).

R< 100.05[EIRP – Psensitivity + Lp,Atm + Lp,Precip – 20log10(fMhz) + 20log10(0.3/4π) + GR + LR - LM ]

(2)

Table 8. Theoretical Range for C2 and Image Data Link
C2 Data
RFD 900+
(1,000 mW / 915 Mhz)
30

Ptx [dBm]
ERIP

Gtx [dBi]

2.5

Ltx [dB]

-1

Psensitivity [dBm]

(-) -115

Lp,Atm [dB] and Lp,Precip [dB]

-5

20log10 (fMhz)

(-) 59.08

0.3
20log10 ( )
4𝜋

(-) 75.27
-32.44

GR [dBi]

2.5

LR [dB]

-1.5

LM [dB]

-20
Total [dB]

Range
[km]

Image Data
Aomway 5.8 GHz
(1,000 mW / 5.8 Ghz)
30

30.98

11.39

Theoretical

35.4

3.7

Rated

40

Not rated

Required

4

The “RFD900+” transceiver was selected as it provides two features that were
useful for the architecture. Firstly, it supports dual diversity antenna which reduces
chances of RF communication breakdown when the receiver and transmitter antenna are
pointing directly at each other. Secondly, it also has a network capability that allows
multiple transceivers to communicate at the same time. This capability may be helpful for
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future development on cooperative control of multiple UAVs. Both features will be
discussed in Section 4.2.4
In general, transmission rate of wireless data depends on the type of transmission
techniques and the maximum transmission power. When data packets are lost due to
interference or excessive distance, the data transmission rate is reduced to facilitate repeat
sending of the lost data packages. Loss of a data package can be reduced with increased
transmission power (Roberts, 2012; 160). The “RFD900+” transmits at a data rate of 250
kbps. At 40 km, the rated air data rate reduces to 64 kbps (RFD 900, nd). Verification
may be required to ensure that the data rate is adequate to support reliable RF
communication.
For the Image data link, the theoretical distance with a 20 dB link margin is
slightly less than the required range. However, this may be acceptable as the Image data
link does not have a direct impact on the SOF. Analysis will be carried out in a later
section of the chapter to analyze the adequacy of the selected component.
Onboard Autopilot Computer
Autonomous flight is facilitated out by the AP computer. It controls the motor and
servos to maintain and/or correct flight heading and profile towards set waypoints. The
servo and motor control signals are generated through the Proportion-Integral-Derivative
(PID) feedback controller function in the AP computer (Beard et al., 2012:95) with inputs
from the various sensors and GPS signal. In addition, the AP computer also provides
programmable built-in fail-safe logic to enhance SOF.
An aircraft’s flight is characterized by twelve state variable equations of motion
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(Beard et al., 2012). To maintain stabilized flight, an AP computer is required to process
and calculate the twelve state motions listed in Table 9. The axis for the state of motions
is referenced in Figure 9. The various superscripts indicate the reference frame of the
motion state, where ‘i’ is the Inertia frame; ‘b’ is the Body frame and ‘v’ is the Vehicle
frame

Table 9. State Variable for Air Vehicle Equations of Motion (Beard et al., 2012:29)

Figure 9: Axes of Motion on UAS (Beard et al., 2012:29)
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Several models of AP computers were employed in earlier AFIT research. This
was attributed to the emergence of new and more capable products in the COTS market
throughout the years. The evolution of AP computers used at AFIT began with “Piccolo
II autopilot” (Jodeh, 2006: 11) and progressed to “KestrelTM autopilot” (Diamond et al.,
2009:30; Seibert et al., 2010:15) with the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” (Shuck 2013:19)
being used most recently.
In this research, the “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected. The aforementioned AP
computer shares the same developer as the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” and was based on
the firmware and software of the latter (3DR, nd). The “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected
as it offers more capabilities over its predecessor. These include separate power supply,
more accurate position estimation and dual sensors. At the same time, application
knowledge with the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” from earlier research can also be
employed due to similarity of firmware and software. The following table compares the
key features that are available on the two AP computers.
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Table 10: Comparison of “Pixhawk autopilot” and “Ardupilot Mega autopilot”
Features and Fail-safes for “Pixhawk autopilot” and “Ardupilot Mega autopilot”
Description
Function
Multi Mode of The AP computer supports numerous modes of flight control input. The three
Control
relevant modes are listed below;
-“Manual Mode” the AP will relay the input from the RC transceiver to the
servos and motor.
- “Stabilized mode”. The AP computer will stabilize the RC inputs by damping
out the servos’ close loop response to reduce oscillation in flight and maintain a
straight and level flight.
-“Autonomous mode” the AP computer will fly the UAV based on the
waypoints and flight profile (mission plans) input by operator at the GS
computer.
Return to
This function can be setup to be initiated from either the RC controller or
Home
“Mission Planner” on the GS laptop. Upon reaching the launch site (home), the
AP computer will maintain the UAV in a loitering pattern and waits for further
command. This facilities immediate contingency response in the event of a
“Mission Planner” of RC controller failure.
GS Fail-Safe This only applicable in the “Autonomous mode”. In the event that RF
communication between the UAV and GS is loss, the AP computer will
automatically return the UAV back to the launch site.
Battery Fail- The battery voltage and current is measured by the AP computer. A lower limit
Safe
can be set to initiate a return to launch site when the measured value falls below
the threshold.
Geo-Fencing Permits setting up of a 3 dimensional flying boundary for the UAS. A 2
dimensional polygonal shaped boundary can be set up through “Mission
Planner” to restrict the UAS operation within a desired area. A maximum and
minimum altitude prescribed by the operator will bound the height of the
polygon. When the virtual fence-line is breeched, the AP computer will take
over and the UAV will be flown autonomously to a pre-defined rally point
within the geo-fencing boundary.
Features and Fail-safes for “Pixhawk autopilot”
Description
Function
Separate
Built with second input interface at servo rail for secondary power supply. The
Power Supply AP computer will switch over to servo rail power in the event of a failure with
the main power bus.
Dual Sensors Built-in with 2 accelerometer and gyroscope. Internal magnetometer works
together with external magnetic compass for more reliable accurate positioning.
GPS Fail-Safe In the event of a GPS failure, the AP computer has the ability to return to the
launch site based on dead reckoning.

Relating to autonomous control, the “Pixhawk autopilot” is integrated with a
gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer and barometer (Pixhawk Specification, nd), see
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Figure 10. The first three sensors provide the parameter data required to measure the
pitch, roll and yaw movement of the air vehicle. The barometer is attached to a pitotstatic sensor that measures pressure and air speed. The altitude, latitude and longitude
were derived by the “Pixhawk autopilot” from data provided by the external GPS and
magnetic compass.

Figure 10: Schematic of “Pixhawk Autopilot” for State Variable of Motion
4.2.4

Integration of Preliminary Architecture

With the key components evaluated, a preliminary architecture was developed by
integrating the identified components listed in Table 6 and is illustrated in the Figure 11.
Tests were conducted on the key components in the next section to verify that the
assigned components can fulfill the allocated functional requirement.
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Figure 11: Preliminary Architecture of “SIG Racal 110”
4.2.5

Testing of Preliminary Architecture

Network Capable Modems
The “RFD 900+” transceiver can be implemented either as a pair or multi-point
network, up to 29 nodes. Multi-point network can only be configured with Version 2.5
firmware. The implementation is differentiated through the configuration setting of the
modems and defining the number of nodes in the network. When a modem is identified
as ‘Node ID’ ‘0’ with ‘Node Destination’ ‘65535’, it functions as a base node and
broadcasts to all the nodes in the network. ‘Node ID’ from ‘1’ to ‘29’with ‘Node
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Destination’ ‘0’ functions as network nodes which communicate through the base node.
The ‘Node Count’ determines the maximum of nodes permissible in the network.
The multi point network can be exploited by setting up a second GS some
distance away from the first GS. With the second GS maintaining visual LOS and control
of the UAV, the UAV can safely transit beyond the visual range of the first GS. This can
be used in incremental flight testing before progressing to beyond visual LOS operation
with a single GS. The multi network capability was verified in a test through the use of a
ground RC vehicle. See Figure 12 for test set up.

Figure 12: Ground Test Setup for “RFD 900+” Network Capability
Two setups were tested with a three node network, two GS and one vehicle, to
better understand the response of the network capability. The first test was setup with
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default configuration of the modem with ‘Node Count’ ‘3’, ‘Node ID ‘2’ and ‘Node
Destination’ ‘65535’. No interference was observed when the three operating nodes were
placed next to each other. Subsequently, the transmission power was adjusted to the
minimum (1 dBm). The two GSs were placed some distance away from each other and a
ground vehicle was operated from GS_1 to GS_2 in ‘Manual mode’, see Figure 13. When
the GSs were placed at a distance where there was no transmission overlap, the AP
computer will stop the vehicle when it exceeds the transmission range of the GS 1. By
reducing the separation to allow for some transmission overlap, the vehicle was
successfully operated between the two GSs.

Figure 13: Ground Testing for “RFD 900+” Default Setting in Manual Mode
The second test was setup with a base node. Similarly, no interference was
observed when the three operating nodes were placed next to each other. It was verified
that new mission plans could be updated to the ground vehicle through either GS.
Mission plans are essentially a sequence of waypoints set in “Mission Planner” that the
vehicle will travel to in the “Autonomous mode”. The latest update would be cached in
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the AP computer and the ground vehicle executed the latest mission plan without
anomaly when the “Autonomous mode” was selected.
However, it is to note that the latest mission plan will only be reflected on the GS
that provided the update and was not automatically reflected on the remaining GS in the
network. Hence, the operator at the remaining GS observed that the autonomous
movement of the vehicle did not correspond to their outdated mission plan. The latest
mission plan will only be reflected when the operator at the remaining GS refreshes their
mission plan on “Mission Planner”.
Standard operating procedures can be implemented to prevent misunderstanding
by the remaining GS that the AP computer is not working properly. Firstly, the operator
that is updating a new mission plan must inform the other operators prior to uploading the
waypoint. Next, in the event when an operator sees that the UAV is not heading towards
the waypoint in his mission plan, the immediate respond shall be to refresh the mission
plan and verify that it is not outdated.
The ground test concludes that two GSs and a single vehicle can be safely
operated in a network with the “Autonomous mode” at an extended distance as long as it
maintains in the transmission range of at least one GS.
Dual Diversity Antenna
In Section 4.2.3, it was highlighted that the “RFD 900+” transceiver supports
dual diversity antenna. A RF system will minimally require a pair of antennas, one to
transmit, the other to receive. The ‘Rubber Ducky’ antenna used in the research is an
omni directional antenna, and has an estimated gain of 5.5 dBi (Jacques et al., 2015). RF
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signal propagate spherically from the side of an omni directional antenna with a null spot
at the top antenna (Jacques et al., 2015), see following figure. Based on propagation
direction of the RF signal, optimal reception is achieved when the length of the receiving
antenna is parallel with the transmitting antenna. In the event where the two antennas are
pointing at each other, the reception strength will be reduced. This situation may arise as
the UAV banks and turns in flight.

Figure 14: RF Propagation and Reception of RF Signals

Figure 15: Orientation of RF Transmitting Antenna
A test was conducted to measure the effect of the relative antenna position to the
received signal strength. The “3DR-915 MHz” transceiver (3DR modem, nd) that
supports only s single antenna was used for the test with the transmission power reduced
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to 1 dBm. The two transceivers were separated by 30 m and the received signal strength
was measured with the direction of the antenna placed at different orientations. The
transmitting antenna was first orientated in plane with the receiving antenna by three
angles (00, 450 and 900). This was repeated in the orthogonal plane; see the following
figure for result.

Figure 16: Received Signal Strength at Different Antenna Orientation
It is observed that the received signal strength will be reduced when the
orientation of antennas are not parallel. The least favorable orientation is when the two
antennas are pointed directly at each other with a measured reduction of 18.7 dB. This is
followed by a 900 orientation in the orthogonal plane with a 6.7 dB reduction. The
orientations of the antennas were arranged in order from the highest received signal
strength to the least in the following table.
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Table 11: Results of Single Antenna Orientation Test
S/N

Antenna orientation

1
2
3
4
5
6

Parallel
45 in orthogonal plane
450 in plane
900 in plane
0
90 in orthogonal plane
Direct pointing
0

Received signal strength
(dB)
-51.5
-53.6
-55.8
-57.6
-58.2
-70.2

Relative drop in signal
strength (dB)
2.1
4.3
6.1
6.7
18.7

Dual diversity permits two antennas to be installed orthogonally on the same
transceiver. With orthogonal antennas, there is no instance when the receiving antennas
are pointing directly at the transmitting antenna. Hence, the least favorable arrangement
is a 900 in-plane rotation, see Figure 17. This mitigates the loss in signal strength to 6.1
dB from 18.7 dB and brings about an improvement to the reliability of the RF
communication as the UAV maneuvers in air.

900 in-plane rotation

Figure 17: Least Favorable Dual Diversity Antenna Orientation
The ground test concludes that selecting a transceiver with dual diversity antenna
would improve the performance and range of the UAS compared to an exact transceiver
that only has single antenna.
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Characterizing C2 Data Link (“RFD 900+”)
A ground test was conducted to verify the transmission range of the “RFD 900+”
transceiver which was installed with a half wavelength “rubber ducky” antenna. The
degradation of signal strength between two “RFD 900+” transceivers when one was
gradually moved apart from the other was measured using the “3DR Radio Configuration
Utility” software. The software measures the received signal and noise level for both
stationary and mobile transceivers at a frequency of 2 Hz. The test was conducted with a
maximum separation of 200 m and repeated at different transmission power. The
following figure illustrates the measurements from the ground test with a transmitted
power of 1dBm (1.26 mW).

Figure 18: Signal Measurement at 1 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”)
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The signals measured in time were translated to distance base on a uniform speed
to travel the separation of 200 m. The average noise level in the figure was calculated
directly from the measured data while the calculated signal strength was derived through
a series of manipulations on Equation (1). The equation was first converted to decibel and
then rearranged based on the separation distance. Thereafter, the various parameters
were condensed into a constant k that results in the equation shown below.
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑃𝑇 𝐺𝑇 𝐿𝑇 𝐿𝑃 𝐺𝑅 𝐿𝑅 (

𝜆 2
)
4𝜋𝑅

Si = PT + k -20*log(R)

(7)
𝜆

Where k = 10 log (𝐺𝑇 𝐿𝑇 𝐿𝑃 𝐺𝑅 𝐿𝑅 ) + 20log (4𝜋)
Equation (7) was mapped onto the preceding figure by assigning a value to the
condensed constant k that forms a line of best fit which normalizes the measured received
signal strength. For the “RFD 900+” that is used for the C2 data link, the value of kC2 for
the test conducted at 1dBm transmitted power was -80 dB. This is represented by the line
titled “Calculated Signal Strength”. The normalized line was not fit to the entire range of
measured signal strength. Instead, emphasis was placed at the end of the separation
distance as the UAV is not expected to operate near the GS.
The value of kC2 was also extended to normalize the measured signal strength at
the transmission power of 2 dBm (1.58 mW) and 5 dBm (3.16mW). The results are
illustrated in the two following figures. The table after the figures summarizes the
measurements and results for all three tests.
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Figure 19: Signal Measurement at 2 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”)
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Figure 20: Signal Measurement at 5 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”)

Table 12: Summary of Measurements on “RFD 900+” Transceiver
TX Power
(dBm)
1
2
5
Average

Noise at stationary transceiver (dB)
Peak
Trough
Mean
-81.21
-105.95
-98.28
-83.34
-106.47
-98.72
-81.74
-104.37
-98.67
-82.10
-105.60
-98.56
Peak Average – Mean Average
16.46

59

Noise at mobile transceiver (dB)
Peak
Trough
Mean
-75.95
-102.79
-94.97
-78.58
-103.84
-97.41
-79.12
-102.26
-96.30
-77.88
-102.96
-96.23
18.34

From the preceding table, it is observed that the measured noise level at the
mobile transceiver was consistently higher than the stationary transceiver across at all
three power settings. For design margin, the noise level of -96.23 dB at the mobile
transceiver was adopted. The difference between the ‘Average Peak’ and ‘Average
Mean’ noise level at the mobile transceiver was 18.34 dB. This is within the expected
link margin of 20 dBm that was applied in Table 8.
At full transmitted power of 30 dBm (1 Watt), the degradation of signal strength
with increasing distance was extrapolated using Equation (7), with kC2 at -80 dB. The
‘Mean Average’ noise level at the mobile transceiver together with a 20 dB link margin
were both imposed on the signal strength plot to calculate the maximum range of the
system. The figure below illustrates the calculated range.
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Figure 21: Calculated Range at 30 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”)
The calculated range (20.48 km) from the ground test was 42.1% lower than the
theoretical range (35.4 km) from Table 8, but was nevertheless above the required range
of 4 km that was specified in Section 4.1. The calculated link margin available at 4 km is
34.18 dB. It is noted that the expected range will vary as ambient RF noise will not be the
same at different operating locations. In the presence of frequency interference, the
maximum range will decrease significantly. In addition, the ground test was conducted
with zero elevation difference between the two transceivers. Signal strength at the same
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distance is expected to improve when the UAV is in the air as there will be less physical
obstacles along the RF LOS between the two transceivers.
Characterizing Image Data Link (“Aomway 5.8 GHz”)
A similar approach to verify the range for the Image data link was attempted on
the “Aomway 5.8 GHz”. However, this was not feasible due to hardware requirements
incompatible with the “3DR Radio Configuration Utility”. An alternative was explored
by using a spectrum analyzer to directly measure the received signal strength and overlay
it on the noise signal from the “RFD 900+” test. However, this was also not adopted as
the unknown internal gains and losses of the spectrum analyzer will be introduced as
additional variables to the analysis.
Hence, an analogous calculation was made using the value of kC2. This is based on
the assumption that the net transmission gain, reception loss and transceiver sensitivity of
the Image data link is approximately the same as the C2 data link. The value of was kC2
was adjusted to kimage by accounting for the higher transmission frequency.
For a more comprehensive analogous calculation, the ground test for C2 data link
was repeated with the single antenna “3DR-915 MHz” transceiver, to obtain an average
value for the constant kC2. The “3DR-915 MHz” transceiver operates with a maximum of
20 dBm (100 mW) in the frequency of 915 MHz (3DR modem, nd). The test was
conducted with the stationary transceiver set to 20 dBm and the mobile transceiver at 1
dBm (1.3 mw). It was observed that data link was lost when the mobile transceiver was at
a distance of 260 m from the stationary.
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Data link
was lost
at 260 m

Figure 22: Signal Measurement for “3DR Radio 915MHz”
From the preceding figure, the value of kC2 that has a line of best fit onto the
signal strength is -121 dB. Between the mobile and stationary transceivers, the higher of
the two average noise received was at -108.63 dB. This measurement varied from the first
C2 data link ground test using the “RFD 900+” (-96.23 dB) as the location was different.
The following table summarizes the measurements for the two C2 data link ground tests.
Calculation of the expected range of the Image data link was based on the average kimage
and noise level from the two tests.
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Table 13: Comparison of Measurements from C2 Data Link Tests

kC2 @ 915 MHz (dB)
Relative kimage @ 5.8 GHz (dB)
Noise level (dB)

“RFD 900” Setup
-80
-96.19
-96.23

“3DR-915 MHz" Setup
-121
-137.19
-108.63

Average
-100.5
-116.69
-102.43

Si = PT + k -20*log(R)
Noise Level +Link Margin = PT + (kimage - Freq increase) - 20*log(R)
-102.43 + Link Margin = 30 + (-116.69) – 20*log(4)
Link Margin = 3.7 dB
From the following figure, it was observed that, the calculated transmission range
with a 20 dB link margin is only 0.61 km. Operation beyond 0.61 km may result in
occasional loss of image when the transient spikes of noise exceed the received signal
strength. At a transmission range of 4 km, the allowable link margin is reduced from 20
dB to 3.7 dB.
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Distance (m)

Figure 23: Analogous Range Calculation for Image Data Link
To achieve undisrupted Image data link, a 23 dBi direction antenna
(MyFlyDream, nd) was added to increase the reception gain. The original rubber ducky
has an estimated gain of 5.5 dBi (Jacques et al., 2015). With a net gain of 17.5 dBi from
the directional antenna, the calculated range is extended to 4.59 km. At the required range
of 4 km there is an available link margin of 21.2 dB, see Figure 23.
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4.3

Risk Management
This section starts with the definition on risk classification. Subsequently, it

proceeds to examine the preliminary architecture and contingency procedures to identify
potential risks and is followed by an analysis of its impact on SOF. Thereafter,
mitigations are implemented to reduce the residual risk of the final architecture to an
acceptable level.
4.3.1

Risk Classification

Risk is defined as a product of mishap severity and mishap probability. The
severity and probability can be measured quantitatively or qualitatively. It is noteworthy
that quantitative data on the reliability of UAS are limited (Cline, 2008:5), in particular,
reliability data for small UAS is generally not available (Murtha, 2009:1). The
categorization of risk severity and probability specified by AFIT’s TRB/SRB are shown
in the following two tables (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014). The qualitative
assessment on the probability of failure used in this research was based on experiences
from past UAS research effort in AFIT.

Table 14. Categorization of Mishap Probability (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014)
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Table 15. Categorization of Mishap Severity (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014)

Severity is related to the consequence of mishap which includes two aspects,
safety to human and cost of damage to system and property. The risk assessment and
acceptance by the TRB/SRB is a comprehensive process which also covers possible
accidents during preparation and pre-flight check. An example of such an accident is the
inadvertent contact of the fingers with a spinning propeller.
The focus of the research is on airworthiness of the UAV. Hence, the assessment
is centered on the UAV when it is in flight and is derived from the consequence of
individual component failure. The risk to personnel safety during handling of the system
will be addressed separately during the TRB/SRB process.
4.3.2

FMECA

Risk identification and analysis were conducted inductively (bottom-up) through
the use of FMECA. The different modes of failure that can occur on each component
were identified and its consequential effect on the system was analyzed to establish the
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level of risk it poses to SOF. To optimize the architecture, the components were grouped
based on their functional domain in the FMECA to facilitate possible development of
mitigating solutions that are applicable to more than one component or failure mode.

Figure 24: Functional Grouping of Components in FMECA
Two functional domains, Payload and Structure, were not covered in the FMECA.
Depending on the nature of operation, different missions require different payloads.
Therefore, FMECA on the payload will be conducted separately in the future upon
clarification of mission requirements. The structural design of COTS RC model aircraft
have been validated by a large base of recreational users. Hence, FMECA is not
conducted for this domain unless the original structure was modified.
Mitigations in the form of hardware redundancy for low-cost UAS are typically
constrained by size, weight, power and budget (Freeman et al., 2014:1). Hence, careful
consideration was taken to ensure that redundancy was not excessively introduced for the
mitigations in the FMECA. In total, there are 34 risks attributing to the various failure
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modes from the 16 components in the preliminary architecture. The detailed analysis on
the risk of each failure mode and its mitigation is documented in Appendix A. The results
of the FMECA and its risk mitigation are summarized in Table 16.

Table 16. Summary of Design Improvements and Contingency Procedures
S/N

Component

1

Primary
Battery

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

GPS/
Magnetic
Compass
Pitot-static
Sensor
Telemetry/
Command
Transceiver
Aileron Servo
Elevator
Servo
Rudder Servo
Flap Servo
Motor
Propeller

11

AP Computer

12

ESC

13

BEC

14

Mission
Planning S/W

15

RC controller

16

Laptop

Mitigation
Design
-Dual power supply for AP computer
-Separate power supply between motor,
avionics and payload
-Connector clips
-Parallel battery arrangement
-Backup flight mode (Manual)

Procedure
-Battery fail-safe

NA

-Separate frequency spectrum
-Frequency hopping capability

-GS fail-safe
-Geo fence

-Individual power supply for servo,
avionics and motor
-Connector clips

-Battery fail-safe

NA
- Backup flight mode (Manual)
-Separate display for FPV image
-OSD to impose telemetry on FPV image
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Severity

E

IV

D

IV

E

IV

E

IV

E

IV

E

III

E

III

E

III

E

IV

E

IV

E

IV

E

IV

-GPS fail-safe

-Backup flight mode (Manual)

-Retain manual flight control for nonpowered landing
-Backup flight mode (Manual)
- Separate power supply between motor,
avionics and payload
-Dual power supply for AP computer
-Retain manual flight control for nonpowered landing
-Power module to limit maximum current
-Dual power supply
NA

Probability

NA
NA

NA

NA
-Return to launch
site from RC
controller
-Return to launch
site from laptop
NA

Among the risks of all the failure modes on a component, the rating with the
highest probability and worst severity was taken and listed in the last two columns of the
table. Details for the various fail-safes mentioned in the table can be found in Appendix
B.
There are a total of one hundred and twenty (�16
� = 120) permutations in which
2

two out of the sixteen components can fail. This is compounded with variation of
multiple failure modes for each permutation. The FMECA did not consider dual

components failure as a simultaneous occurrence which individually has ‘very unlikely’
probability is extremely remote. An exhaustive analysis for such remote probability of
occurrence will yield minimal value in improving the design of the architecture.
4.3.3

Risk Analysis

Risk acceptance by AFIT’s TRB/SRB is based on an integrated assessment
matrix, of severity and probability. Risks residing in the region of ‘Medium Risk’ will not
be accepted (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014:7) and thus require further
mitigation. The risks associated with each component failure listed in the preceding table
are mapped onto the assessment matrix in the Figure 25.
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1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
9, 10, 11, 12

8, 13, 14, 15, 16

Figure 25: Risk Mapping on Assessment Matrix (AFIT, 2014)
Post mitigation, the risks associated with the failures of most components has
been reduced to the region of ‘Negligible Risk’. Those that remained in the region of
‘Low Risk’ are associated with the possibility when unaware personnel did not move out
of the landing path of the UAV during a non-powered landing.
For Risk #9 (Motor failure) and #10 (Propeller failure), further mitigation could
not be implemented without a change in fuselage design to a twin engine platform.
Mitigation to Risk #12 (ESC failure) may be implemented through parallel ESC
operation. However, this is restricted by the capability of the AP computers. The
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“Pixhawk autopilot” has the ability to control multiple motors each with its individual
ESC. However, it does not have the ability to control a motor through two parallel ESCs.
For Risk #11 (AP computer failure), a complete AP computer failure is defined as
a situation where no data or power is passed through or processed by the “Pixhawk
Autopilot”. Further mitigation for this risk is possible with a second AP computer that
shares the same input and has either 1) an independent output or 2) a parallel output. The
prior would require a switch to select which AP computer to be in control. However, the
switch would present itself as a single point of failure. If the reliability of the switch is
lower than the AP computer, it would increase the overall probability of a loss in AP
control.
The second option with parallel output could not be achieved as the firmware for
“Pixhawk autopilot” does not support parallel operation of two AP computers.
Furthermore, it does not permit one in backup mode. Literature review has also revealed
that there is no known COTS AP computer that possesses the required capability to
support dual auto pilot operation. Hence, the residual risk is retained in the Low Risk
region which is acceptable by the TRB/SRB.
4.4

Intermediate Architecture
The next figure shows the integrated architecture of the UAS post mitigation from

the FMECA. Iterative testing was conducted to verify the new features that were added
and are documented in the next section.
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Figure 25: Intermediate Architecture of UAS Post FMECA

4.5

Iterative Testing of Intermediate Architecture
Manual RC control and Geo-Fencing are the two key features added in the

intermediate architecture. The manual RC control serves as a back-up mode to the AP
computer. The Geo-Fencing feature in the “Pixhawk autopilot” is programmed to
prevent the UAV from flying beyond the transmission range of the transceivers.
Characterizing RC Data Link (“Taranis” and “FrSky L9R”)
Manual RC flight is a common mode of control used by recreational users and is
regularly integrated with a COTS AP computer for stabilized or autonomous flight.
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Verification on the transmission range of the RC transceiver is necessary to ensure that it
can accommodate the specified distance. The RC controller manufactured by “Taranis”
was used in earlier research. To maintain familiarity by the Ground Operator, the
“Taranis” RC controller was retained. Familiarity with the RC controller during flight
testing is essential as the Ground Operator functions as the safety pilot and responses to
contingency through the “Manual mode”.
The operating frequency of the RC data link is 2.4 GHz and uses digital
modulation which does not conflict with the C2 and Image data link. The RC commands
are input through the “Taranis” controller by the Ground Operator and received by the
“FrSky L9R” transceiver on board the Air vehicle. In return, the transceiver would send
regular signals to the controller which informs the Ground Operator that communication
link between the transceivers is still intact.
Adopting the same approach used for the Image data link, the range of the RC
Data link was calculated using Equation (7). For undisrupted transmission, the RC Signal
Strength (Si) received by the UAV must be equal to or greater than the combined noise
level and allocated link margin. From “Taranis” manual (Taranis, nd), the transmitted
power is 100 mW (20 dBm). Similar to the Image data link, the average noise level
measured from the two C2 data link test was used. Compensating for the lower
transmission frequency, the range of the RC data link is shown with the following
calculation.
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Si = PT + k -20*log(R)
Noise Level +Link Margin = PT + (kC2 - Freq increase) - 20*log(R)
-102.43 + 20 = 20 + (-100.5 - 7.67) – 20*log(R)
20*log (R) = -5.74
R = 0.52 km
The calculated transmission range with a 20 dB link margin is 0.52 km. Without
the link margin, the range increases to 5.16 km. At 4 km, the link margin is reduced from
20 dB to 2.22 dB. The distance rated for “FrSky L9R” receiver with a “Taranis”
controller is 3 km to 5 km (Frsky L9R, nd). The comparable value between calculated
and rated range provided further assurance on the assumptions for the k factor and noise
level.
To reduce disruption to the RC data link within the 4 km range, the link margin is
compensated with an increase in transmission power. However, amplification of RF
power is limited to 1,000 mW (30 dBm) for a carrier signal at 2.4 GHz (Code of Federal
Regulation, 2009: 824; Federal Communications Commission, 1996: 20). With an
increase of 10 dB, the undisrupted range is increased to 1.6 km. Without the 20 dB link
margin, the range is extended to 16.3 km. When operating at the 4 km range, the
permissible link margin is reduced to 12.22 dB. The rated range for a 1,000 mW
amplifier with 2.4 GHz is 4 to 8 miles (6.4 -12.9 km) (3DR Amplifier, nd).
The regulatory limit on the amplification of the transmitted power was attributed
to the cap of 36 dBm on the EIRP when the antenna gain is specified at 6 dBi. However,
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there is provision in the regulation to increase the antenna gain by reducing the
transmitted power. At 30 dBm (1,000 mW) transmitted power, for every 3 dBi increase in
antenna gain, the transmission power must be reduced by 1 dBm (Code of Federal
Regulation, 2009: 825).
Si = PT + k -20*log(R)
Noise Level +Link Margin = PT + (kC2 - Freq increase + gain increase) - 20*log(R)
-102.43 + 20 = 24.77 + (-100.5 - 7.67 + 13.5) – 20*log(R)
R = 4.23 km
If the transmission power is boosted to 300 mW (24.77 dBm) and a directional
antenna with 19 dBi gain was used, there will be an overall increase of 18.27 dB in the
range calculation in Equation (7). Recalling Section 2.4.5, the net gain in the k factor with
the directional antenna will be reduced to 13.5 dBi. These modifications will ensure that
there will be adequate link margin for the RC data link within the 4.23 km.
Table 17. Summary of Results for Different RC Data Link Configuration
Configuration
Normal
Antenna Gain (24 dBi)
Increase Power (300mW)
Increase Power & Antenna Gain (19dBi)

With 20 dB
Link Margin
0.52
4.35
1.6
4..23

Range (km)
Without 20 dB
Link Margin
5.16
43.45
16.33
42.32

Rated

Link Margin
at 4 km (dB)

3-5
NA
6.4 - 12.9
NA

2.22
20.7
12.22
20.5

Geo-Fencing
Geo-Fencing is a feature on the “Pixhawk autopilot” that was not employed in
previous AFIT research. This feature is adapted in the architecture to restrict the flight
76

profile of the UAS within a desired location and altitude range. The Geo-fence is set up
on the geo-map in the “Mission Planner” with a polygon of maximum 18 points. The
maximum and minimum altitude are also defined as part of the setup.
Ground tests were conducted to familiarize with the feature and to verify the
response when the fence is breached. The details on the Geo-Fencing feature of “Pixhawk
autopilot” are documented in Appendix B. Hardware in the Loop testing was carried out
in the laboratory. The airborne sub-system was simulated through the software called
“Flight Gear” which generates the necessary flight data to the “Pixhawk autopilot”
though the “Mission Planner”. However, due to compatibility issues between the
versions of software that were available in the laboratory the desired response could not
be simulated. Consequently, a ground test was setup.
The ground test was conducted with a partial setup of the system as shown in
Figure 28. Without the propulsion subsystem, the “Air Vehicle” was carried and moved
towards the Geo-fence line with the system set in “Manual flight” mode. Upon passing
the fence line, the “Pixhawk autopilot” immediately switches itself into “Guide flight”
mode with the direction of the UAV’s intended heading aligning to the rally point in
“Mission Planner”.
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Figure 26: Setup for Geo-Fencing Ground Test
It must be highlighted that in flight, the Air Vehicle will require some time to
change its flight profile and turn back to the rally point. Hence, some distance must be
buffered for the Geo-fence. This distance will depend on the flight characteristics of the
Air Vehicle, maximum prescribed bank angle and turning radius. Test flights within
visual LOS will be conducted to verify the buffer distance required by the “SIG Rascal
110” to turn back to the rally point upon a breech in Geo-fence.
4.6

Final Architecture
The final architecture of the small UAS and the range of the various data links are

shown in the following figure and table. The concept to operate the UAS beyond visual
LOS is depicted in Figure 28. Progressing from bench tests, the architecture is
incrementally tested in visual LOS flight to verify the various functions. The conduct of
the test flights and its results will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Figure 27: Final Architecture of UAS
Table 18. Summary of Transmission Range for Individual Data Links
Data link
type
C2

Frequency
Range
915 Mhz

Max. Range with
20 dB link margin
20.48 km

Link Margin
at 4 km (dB)
34.18

RC

2.4 GHz

4.23 km

20.5

Image

5.8 Ghz

4.59 km

21.2
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Remark
Nil
300 mW amplification and 19
dBi directional antenna
23 dBi directional antenna

Figure 28: Concept for Beyond LOS Operation
4.7

Bill of Material
Using the empty weight cost of $10,000/lbs for the “Dragon Eye”, the 11 lbs “SIG

Rascal 110” would cost $110,000. Table 19 shows the BOM and the corresponding cost
for the design. Base on the architecture with COTs component, the total cost is
$2,094.24. Comparatively, a loss of a COTS based UAV will only cost 2% of an UAV
that meets military specifications. The empty weight cost is calculated from the UAV and
does not include the equipment and components at the GS. Refer to Appendix C for
source reference on cost of product.
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Table 19. Bill of Material for Final Architecture
Description
Sig Rascal 110
Servo
Motor (HimaxHC6332-230 Brushless Electric Motor)
Propeller (APC 19x10E)
Anti Spark (50 Ohm resistor)
Arming Switch
ESC (120 A)
PM (45 V)
Pixhawk Autopilot computer
Telemetry Transmitter (RFD 900+ modem)
Telemetry Antenna (900MHz)
RC Transceiver
Video transmitter (Aomway 5.8 GHz TX 1000)
BEC
Diode
GPS/Magnetic Compass
Pitot-static Sensor
OSD
Camera (Hack HD camera PCB)
Voltage regulator (5 V)
Battery (Primary - 6 cell 8,000mAh )
Battery (Backup - 3 cell 1,300mAh)
Battery (Payload - 3 cell 1,300mAh)

4.8

Qty
1
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
2
1
Total

Unit Cost
Cost
$549.99
$549.99
$0.00
$0.00
$199.99
$199.99
$12.99
$12.99
$0.00
$0.00
$12.99
$12.99
$265.95
$265.95
$21.28
$21.28
$199.99
$199.99
$89.50
$89.50
$7.95
$15.90
$38.95
$38.95
$84.90
$84.90
$24.99
$24.99
$0.00
$0.00
$89.99
$89.99
$54.99
$54.99
$16.32
$16.32
$164.95
$164.95
$6.65
$6.65
$40.43
$161.72
$11.90
$23.80
$11.90
$11.90
$2,047.74

Summary
This chapter began by defining the system specification for the requirements and

the evaluation of key components. Thereafter, the iterative development for the physical
architecture through the use of FMECA as a risk management approach was documented.
A bill of material at the end of the chapter tabulates the cost of the UAV in the final
architecture and compares it to the cost of a similar size UAV based on the empty weight
cost of the “Dragon Eye”. Incremental flight testing will be conducted within visual LOS
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to progressively verify key aspects of the architecture to garner confidence before an
actual flight beyond visual LOS. This progressive testing will be elaborated in the next
chapter.
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V. Test Results and Post Test Hazard Analysis

The MFR for the “SIG Rascal 110” prescribes that the UAV must always be
maintained within visual LOS during operation, either by the operator or ground
observers. This means that the UAV can fly beyond the visual LOS of the operator
provided that a forward deployed observer maintains visual contact and has means of
communication with the GS. Incremental flights test will be designed on this principle to
progressively verify key aspects of the architecture.
5.1

Incremental Test Flights
A series of tests was designed to incrementally verify the capability of the

architecture in order to garner confidence for an actual flight that is beyond visual LOS.
The first series of flight tests is aimed at verifying the features in the architecture that
were not present in previous research, namely the network capability of the “RFD 900+”
and the Geo-fencing of the “Pixhawk autopilot”.
The first series of flight tests was conducted within visual LOS from the operator
and scaled down transmission power of the “RFD 900+” to simulate operation in a
farther range. As the payload is not required for the test, the corresponding components
were not installed. See the following figure for the tested architecture.

83

Figure 29: Architecture of Flight Tested UAS
In Section 4.3.1, it was discussed that the risk assessment for personnel safety
during handling of the system will be addressed separately during the TRB/SRB process.
The details on the aforementioned assessment, together with the test procedures, can be
referenced to the approved TRB/SRB document (Seah, 2015).
5.1.1

Network Capability Test

Discussed in Section 4.2.5, the network capability of the “RFD 900+” transceiver
can be used to gain confidence on the architecture so as to incrementally extend the
operating range to beyond visual LOS. At the lowest transmission power (1 dBm) of the
“RFD 900+” transceivers, the maximum allowable separation distance between the GS
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and UAV was calculated. From Section 4.2.5 the measure kC2 is -80 dB. Using the
average noise of -96.23 dB and factoring a 20 dB link margin, the calculated range from
Equation (7) is 0.727 km

Si = PT + k -20*log(R)

(7)

-96.23 + 20 = 1 -80 -20*log (R)
R = 0.727 km
From section 4.1.2, the range for visual LOS operation with “SIG Rascal 110”” is
approximately 300 m and 600 m in “Manual mode” and “Autonomous mode”,
respectively. From section 4.5, the transmission range of the RC transceiver, with 20 dB
link margin, is 520 m. To safely conduct a flight test that is permissible by the MFR, the
two GSs were separated by approximately 200 m, a distance which the safety pilot can
safely control the UAV in “Manual mode” from GS_1 in the event of an emergency.
A total of three tests were designed and conducted to verify the network
capability of the UAS. This was carried out with the two GSs co-located next to each
other. The capabilities tested were 1) updating of mission plan in the network, 2) network
redundancy with one ground node disconnected and 3) network fail-safe with all ground
nodes disconnected. These tests were conducted with a mission plan that is created
between the two GS, and within the permitted flight altitude. The test flight envelope is
reflected by the non-shaded area in the following figure.
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Figure 30: Airspace Envelope for Flight Test
Network Update
A flight test similar to the ground test conducted in Section 4.2.5 was replicated.
While the UAV was loitering above a prescribed location in “Autonomous mode”, a new
waypoint was updated to the mission plan from GS_1, with GS_2 intentionally
maintained with the outdated plan. No anomaly was observed when the UAV received
the new mission plan and preceded flying towards the new waypoint. The telemetry and
flight path of the UAV for the new mission plan was correctly reflected in both GSs.
However, as the mission plan at GS_2 was not updated, the new flight path did not
correspond to the outdated plan to loiter at the initial location. Nonetheless, this does not
have any adverse effect on the UAS.
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Network Redundancy
A second test was conducted to verify the robustness of the network. In a
repetition of the first test, while the UAV is flying towards the new way point, the
transceiver at GS_1 was disconnected. At the same time, the mission plan at GS_2 was
refreshed. The test was successfully conducted with no anomaly observed on the UAS
and the current mission plan.
Network Fail-Safe
The third test began with the UAV loitering above a prescribed location in
“Autonomous mode”. A new mission plan was updated from GS_1. While the UAV was
executing the mission plan both GSs were disconnected and reconnected immediately.
Reconnection took less than the allocated Fail-safe duration of 20 sec. During this period,
no anomaly was observed on the UAV as it continues with its current mission plan.
The test was repeated, but this time, the two GSs were intentionally left
disconnected beyond the 20 sec Fail-safe duration. It was observed that the UAV
responded accordingly to the Fail-safe sequence and return to the launch site after 20 sec.
Thereafter, the connection was reestablished and the UAV promptly resumed its last
mission plan.
The three set of tests concluded that there will be no anomaly to the UAS as long
as one GS remains in transmission with the UAV. It also demonstrated that the UAV will
respond to the latest mission plan that is cached in its AP computer. Outdated mission
plan reflected in the remaining ground nodes will not have an adverse effect to the UAS.
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In the event of a GS reconnection after a complete loss of network transmission, the UAV
will resume its current mission plan after it recovers from the fail-safe action.
5.1.2

Geo-Fencing Test

The Geo-fence was manually activated with a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM)
signal from the RC console that was set above 1,750. The fence will remain activated as
long as the AP computer receives a PWM signal that is above 1,750. The response to a
breach in Geo-fence was verified for operations in the three commonly employed modes
“Autonomous mode”, “Stabilized mode” and “Manual mode”. A Geo-fence was set
around the GS with its boundary within visual LOS and the permissible flight altitude,
refer to Figure 30. A rally point (location and altitude) was identified within the boundary
for the UAV to return and loiter around when the fence is breached. This test was carried
out with intentional breaches to the Geo-fence boundary.
The original intent was to activate the Geo-fence through “Mission Planner” from
the GS. However, it was realized during the flight test that this approach was not feasible
as PWM signal can only be transmitted from the RC console. The last available PWM
switch on the RC console for the Sig Rascal 110 was configured for a separate geomapping test and decision was made not alter the setup. The test was eventually carried
out with a Super Sky Surfer UAS that was installed with the “ArduPilot Mega” AP
computer instead. There is no difference in the Geo-fence feature for the “Pixhawk” and
“ArduPilot Mega” AP computer as they share the same firmware and software.
From the GS, it was observed that the AP computer responded immediately upon
a breach in the fence boundary. In all three modes, the UAV switched over to “Guided88

mode” and returned to the rally point when it breached the fence boundary. Once inside
the boundary, the “Guided-mode” can be switched out through a cycle of the mode
switch on the RC console to regain control of the UAV. Due to inertia, the UAV requires
some response distance to change its flight heading and return back to the fence
boundary. The turn radius will depend on the aerodynamic capability and the control
setting of the UAV. For the SIG Rascal 110, a response distance of 30 m is recommended
and should be factored in as part of the area where the UAV is not permitted to operate
outside.
No anomaly was observed on the function of the Geo-fence feature. However,
two operational concerns were noted during the test. Firstly, the flight path overlay on the
map and Geo-fence boundary is only visible from the GS console. During “Manual
mode” or “Stabilized mode” the safety pilot can only estimate the boundary and may not
be aware that the UAV has breached the fence which result a switch to “Guided-mode”.
There is no indication of “Guide-mode” on the safety pilot’s RC console. Without active
communication from the GS to signal a breech in fence boundary, the safety pilot may
misinterpret that there is a failure in the RC console as the UAV is not responding to the
manual controls, resulting to unwarranted distress.
The second concern is on switching out from “Guided mode” after a breach in
boundary. To toggle out of “Guided mode”, the safety pilot will cycle the mode switch on
the RC console. This however will not have any effect if the UAV is still outside the
boundary. To regain control of the UAV while it is outside the fence, the safety pilot will
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first have to de-activate the Geo-fence before toggling the mode switch. The safety pilot
will similarly be subjected to unwarranted distress without familiarity to this response.
5.1.3

UAV Setting

The setting on the UAV was documented in Table 20 to facilitate replication of
the system.
Table 20: Flight Setting of Autopilot Computer
Servo Gains
Proportional
Integral
Derivative
Max Integrator

Roll Servo
1.5
0.04
0.1
15

Total Energy
Control System

Pitch Servo
1.5
0.07
0.1
15

Max Climb

Min Sink

Max Sink

5 (m/s)

2 (m/s)

5 (m/s)

Yaw servo
1
0.1
0.05
15
Pitch
Dampening
0

Tine
Constant
5

Airspeed
(m/s)

Cruise
20

Min Fly-by-wire
12

Max Fly-by-wire
40

Ratio
1.994

Throttle
(0-100%)

Cruise
50

Min
20

Max
60

Slew Rate
100

Navigation Angle

Max Bank
45

Pitch Max
15

Pitch Min
-25

L1 Control – Turn
Control

Period
25

Damping
0.75

Other Max

P to T
-

Rudder Mix
0.5

5.1.4

Battery Consumption

The battery consumption for the motor and the avionics/servo were characterized
to facilitate endurance planning for future research. When applying the consumption rate,
a 10% safety factor is recommended as the flight condition and profile will not be the
same for all operation.
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5.2

•

Average consumption rate for the avionics/servos bus was 2,700 mA per hour.

•

Average consumption rate for the motor bus was 10,982 mA per hour.
Post Fight Test Hazard Analysis
Results from the flight test have verified the robustness of the network capability

and the dependability of the Geo-fencing feature. No new or unforeseen hazard was
observed during the test. The successful flight test provided assurance on the designed
capability and paves the way for the next sequences of flight tests which will
progressively and incrementally test the architecture’s capability to extend the operating
range beyond visual LOS. The subsequent sequence of flight tests is discussed in the
next section.
5.3

Proposed Approach for Sequential Flight Test
The following sequence of flight tests is proposed to progressively test the

architecture capability with incremental range. The aim is to collect test points at
increased range for the application of a new MFR to operate beyond visual LOS.
Sequence Two Flight Test
The second sequence will test the full architecture of the UAS which includes the
payload that was not installed during the first flight test. This test will be conducted
within visual LOS at full transmission power, but with an increased separation distance
between the two GS to 400 m which is twice that of the first sequence. A safety pilot will
be positioned between the two GSs to retain the ability to control the UAV in “Manual
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mode”. This will facilitate as a backup in the event of an unforeseen failure with the
architectural integration.
Seamless RF transmission is assured through the characterization of the various
transceivers in Chapter 4. The separation distance of 400 m between the two GS will be
within the 4 km designed transmission range (with 20 dB link margin). In addition, the
flight boundary of the test envelope will also be contained by the Geo-fence. This is
illustrated with the non-shaded area in the following figure.

Figure 31: Concept for Second Sequence of Flight Test
Sequence Three Flight Test
A successful test flight on the second sequence would be the final verification to
the integration of the full architecture and will provide assurance that the architecture will
perform as designed. The third sequence of test flight will increase the separation
distance between the two GSs to 1.4 km which exceed the visual LOS from the individual
GS. This distance would also be the furthest operating range for past and current AFIT
research on small UAS.
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Complying with the MFR’s requirement, the safety pilot will be positioned
between the two GS to provide overlap and maintain visual LOS throughout the entire
separation. From Chapter 4, the separation distance of 1.4 km between the two GS will be
within the 4 km designed transmission range (with link margin). Hence, RF link for the
C2 data and image data between the individual GS and the UAV would be maintained
throughout the test boundary. This will be the same for the RC data link between the
UAV and RC console of the safety pilot. Refer to the following figure for the concept of
the third sequence of test flight.

Figure 32: Concept for Third Sequence of Flight Test
Incremental testing with the three aforementioned sequences will provide the data
points required to verify that the designed UAS can successfully operate over a distance
of 1.4 km. The successful test points where GS_1 still has RF link with the UAV when it
is flying above GS_2 can then be used to seek an approval for a second MFR to operate
the UAS over the tested range of 1.4 km with a single GS. Thereafter, Sequence Three of
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the flight test can be iterated to build upon the data points for an operating distance of 2.8
km between two GSs.
With the concluded test point, a third MFR will be sought to operate an UAV up
to the range of 2.8 km with a single GS. The designed range of 4 km will finally be tested
at the third iteration of Sequence Three flight test. Alternatively, with the second MFR to
operate at a range of 1.4 km, four GSs can be arranged in a line with a total separation
distance of 4.2 km between the first and last GS.
5.4

Summary
The flight test conducted for this research demonstrated the capability and

robustness of the new features in the designed architecture that were not employed in
previous AFIT research. The responses of the UAS to these features were also
documented in the chapter to facilitate application of the architecture for possible future
research efforts. Finally the achievement of the flight test with no new hazard observed
reflects the level of comprehensiveness in the risk assessment and iterative designing
process that was carried out in Chapter 4 of the research.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter concludes the research and highlights its significance. Thereafter,
recommendations are also made for future work.
6.1

Conclusions of Research
The research has achieved two of the three objectives that were established in

Section 1.2. The first objective is to develop the architecture for a small UAS, based on
COTS components, which is capable of operating at a distance five times that of the
visual LOS range. This was achieved through parametric analysis and ground testing.
The second objective is to establish a framework and document the development
process to facilitate effective and reliable replication on other AFIT small UAS for future
research. The effectiveness of the framework was demonstrated with the successful
designing and testing of the UAS in a short period of nine months. The reliability of the
UAS architecture developed through the framework was vindicated by the successful
flight tests. Finally, the characterization data, test procedures and the results were
documented to facilitate future replication.
The last objective to validate the designed architecture and to seek air worthiness
to operate beyond visual LOS was not fully achieved. This was attributed to the
incremental approach of flight testing and MFR revisions discussed in Chapter 5. This
process required considerable lead time which extended beyond the duration of the
research. Hence, a proposed sequence of flight testing was documented in Section 5.3 as
a continuation to complete the remaining objective.
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With the completion of this research, the three investigative questions identified
in Section 1.3 were addressed as below.
i.

What are the requirements for a framework to effectively and reliably repeat the
capability on other small UASs?
A structured framework to repeat the development of the architecture and apply

them on other UAS was adapted from the DoD System Engineering Process. The
requirements were documented in Section 3.1 of this research.
ii.

What COTS components are required in a small UAS architecture to operate
beyond visual LOS and how is the architecture integrated and validated?
From the framework established for the previous question, the architecture of the

small UAS to operate beyond visual LOS was developed through an iterative designing
process. Integration and validation of the architecture was demonstrated by the successful
conduct of flight test and documented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The final architecture
employed for the UAS is documented in Section 4.6. The COTS components required for
the architecture can be found in Section 4.7 of this thesis.
iii.

What are the hazards associated with beyond visual LOS operation and how can
they be mitigated to achieve airworthiness approval?
The hazards associated with beyond LOS operation were identified and mitigated

through the FMECA process. The outcome is summarized in Section 4.3.2 and the details
can be found in Appendix A of the document.
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The COTS based UAS architecture offered an economical alternative that
required a shorter development time compared to conventional design and build
approach. As a comparison to the empty weight cost of a conventional UAS with
components that meets military specification, the COTS based “SIG Rascal 110” cost
98% less. The total development time from design and prototyping, including
documentation, for the UAS took nine months.
6.2

Significance of Research
Two significant issues were drawn from the research. Firstly, the legally available

COTS transceivers for the RC and Image data links selected to achieve a range of 4 km
for the “Sig Rascal 110” is at the edge of current technological limits. To further increase
the range, an improvement in technology to economically increase the sensitivity to the
transceivers is required. This will increase the overall system gain in the link budget
without exceeding the legal limit on the transmission power.
Alternatively, a change in transmitting frequency can be adopted. Indicated in
Equation (2), a reduction in frequency will increase the transmission range at the same
power. From the research on long range flights in Section 2.5.3, the following
frequencies may be used as an alternative to increase the operating range with current
technological limits.

Table 21: Comparison of Current and Alternate Transmission Frequencies

Current
Alternative

C2 data link
915 MHz
No change

RC data link
2.4 GHz
433 MHz
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Image data link
5.8 GHz
2.4 GHz or 1.3 GHz

To adopt the alternate frequencies, new considerations have to be addressed. In
particular, license is required to transmit beyond 12 mW and 75 mW in the 433 MHz
band and 1.3 GHz respectively.
Secondly, the use of COTS component has its inherent challenges in dealing with
rapid changes in technology. The components identified for the architecture may be
replaced by new and better alternatives and will no longer be available after a short span
of time. The interface and relationship between the individual components architecture
illustrated in the architecture will facilitate the selection and integration of new
replacement components to the existing system.
6.3

Recommendations for Future Research
As a continuation to achieve a MFR to operate at the designed range of 4 km, the

incremental testing proposed in Section 5.3 is recommended. In addition, the network
capability of the C2 transceiver may be explored for multiple UAV control from a single
GS. This can theoretically be achieved by configuring the GS as the base node instead of
its current arrangement as a network node.
.
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Appendix A: Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis

1.

Power Supply Sub-system

Component: Battery (Primary)
Hazard
Mode

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Mitigation

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Design
-Separate power supply from avionics
and payload
Loss of
component
function

-Dual power supply to AP computer to
maintain power to servo and transceivers

Component failure

-Loss of power to
motor
Exceed planned
duration
Depleted capacity

-Loss of power
AP computer

-Loss of thrust
-Aircraft enters into a
controlled nonpower descend

Insufficient Charge
Connector failure
Loss connection
Loose connectors
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-Parallel battery arrangement to maintain
adequate voltage supply when one series of
battery fails
Procedure
-Pixhawk has a configurable Battery failsafe logic to initiate return to launch site
when battery reached a set minimum
voltage and/or battery capacity level.
Procedure
-Labels to identify expended battery from
charged ones
Procedure
-Full-functional check prior to launch
Design
-Used of connector clips to ensure security
between wire connectors
Overall

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

Component: Battery (laptop)
Hazard
Mode
Causal factor
Loss of component
Component failure
function
Exceed planned
duration
Depleted capacity
Insufficient Charge
Connector failure

Effect
Immediate

System

-Loss of power to
GS transceivers,
Mission Planner
and monitor
display

-Loss of telemetry
monitoring and
capability to amend
mission plan in flight

Mitigation

Prob

Design
-Redundancy of power supply from
generator

E

Severity
Health Cost

IV

IV

Loss connection
Loose connectors
Overall
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E

IV

2.

Sensor Sub-system

Component: GPS / Magnetic Compass
Hazard

Effect

Mode

Causal factor

Loss of GPS Link
(Unable to be reestablished)

Inadequate number
of satellite signal

Loss of
component
function

Immediate

System
-Uncontrolled flight
heading and altitude.

-AP loses
orientation
Component failure

-Loss of autonomous
capability, air vehicle
is unable to proceed
to way point

Mitigation
Procedure
-In autonomous mode, Pixhawk has a
configurable GPS fail-safe logic that
initiate circling at location when GPS signal
is loss for more than 3 seconds. Return to
launch site via dead reckoning will be
initiated if loss in GPS link exceeds 20 sec

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

D

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and land
air vehicle via FPV
Overall

D

IV

Mitigation

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Component: Pitot-static Sensor
Hazard

Effect

Mode

Causal factor

Immediate

System

Leak in air tube

Damage during
installation/handling

-Lower air
pressure to sensor

-Lower air speed
perceived by AP.

Erratic air
pressure data
output

Intermittent failure
of sensor

-Fluctuating air
pressure from
sensor

-Fluctuating air speed
perceived by AP.

Loss of
component
function

Component failure

-Loss of air
pressure data

-Loss of air speed
data
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-Latent failure. Non observable unless sever
leak resulted to perceived airspeed is lower
than minimum airspeed limit.
-Latent failure. Non observable unless
fluctuation is significant and noticed by the
ground operator.
Procedure
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV
Overall

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

3.

Transceiver Sub-system

Component: Telemetry/command transceiver
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Component failure

Exceed transmission
range

-Loss of telemetry
data

-Air vehicle
performance cannot
be monitored from
the GS
-New mission plan
cannot be updated to
the air vehicle

Loss of
transmission data
Signal interference

Mitigation
Procedure
-Pixhawk has a configurable GS fail-safe
logic to initiate circling at location when
telemetry link is lost for more than 1.5. A
return to launch site will be initiated when
loss of telemetry link exceeds 20 sec
Procedure
-Geo-fence can be programmed into the AP
computer to initiate a return to launch site
when the air vehicle fly beyond the set
boundary
Design
-Separate frequency spectrum between
different transceiver in the UAS
-Select modem with frequency hopping
capability
Overall
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Prob

Severity
Health Cost

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

Component: RC transceiver
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Component failure

Exceed transmission
range

-Loss RC
communication
link

-Loss of backup
manual capability by
UAS

Loss of
transmission data
Signal interference

Mitigation
Procedure
-Pixhawk has a configurable Throttle failsafe logic to initiate circling at location
when RC link is lost for more than 1.5 sec.
If link lost exceeds 20 sec, a return to
launch site will be enabled
Procedure
-Geo-fence can be programmed into the AP
computer to initiate a return to launch site
when the air vehicle fly beyond the set
boundary
Design
-Separate frequency spectrum between
different transceiver in the UAS
-Select modem with frequency hopping
capability
Overall
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Prob

Severity
Health Cost

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

4.

Servo Sub-system

Component: Aileron
Hazard
Mode

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Mitigation

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Procedure
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode
Loss of
component
function

Erratic servo
response

Component failure

-Loss of servo
movement

- Loss of rolling
capability by air
vehicle

Intermittent failure
of servos

-Servo does not
respond according
to input command

- Chattering of
control surface as AP
constantly corrects
for the servo
deflection

Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Overall

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Component: Elevator
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Erratic servo
response

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Component failure

-Loss of servo
movement

-Loss of pitching
capability by air
vehicle

Intermittent failure
of servos

-Servo does not
respond according
to input command

- Chattering of
control surface as AP
constantly corrects
for the servo
deflection

Mitigation
Design
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Overall
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E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

Component: Rudder
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Erratic servo
response

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Component failure

-Loss of servo
movement

-Loss of yawing
capability by air
vehicle

Intermittent failure
of servos

-Servo does not
respond according
to input command

-Chattering of control
surface as AP
constantly corrects
for the servo
deflection

Mitigation

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Design
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Overall

E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Component: Flap
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Erratic servo
response

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

System

Component failure

-Loss of servo
movement

-Loss in additional
lift and braking
capability by air
vehicle

Intermittent failure
of servos

-Servo does not
respond according
to input command

- Chattering of
control surface as AP
constantly corrects
for the servo
deflection

Mitigation
Design
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly
air vehicle back manually via FPV without
affected servo
Overall
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E

IV

IV

E

IV

IV

E

IV

5.

Propulsion Sub-system

Component: Motor
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Effect
Causal factor

Immediate

Component failure

-Loss of torque to
propeller

System
-Loss of lift to wings

Mitigation
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode for
controlled non power manual landing via
FPV
Overall

Prob

E

Severity
Health Cost
III

IV

E

III

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Component: Propeller
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Causal factor
Component failure
Mid air collision
with birds

Effect
Immediate
-Loss of thrust
from propeller

System
-Loss of lift to wings

Mitigation
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode for
controlled non power manual landing via
FPV
Overall

E

III

E

Severity for failure of motor or propeller is accorded as category III due to possible risk to personnel safety if unaware
personnel did not get out of the landing path of the UAV.
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IV
III

6.

Control Sub-system

Component: Autopilot Computer
Hazard
Mode

Effect
Causal factor

Complete loss of
component
function (lose
bypass logic to
manual mode)
Partial loss of
component
function
(minimally retains
bypass logic to
manual mode and
power supply to
servo)

Immediate
-Loss of power to
motor, servo and
transceiver

System
-Aircraft enters into
an non-power and uncontrolled descend
with servos fixed in
the last position prior
to loss of AP

Component failure
-Loss of power to
motor and
transceiver

-Loss of lift and
telemetry link

Mitigation

Prob

Procedure
-Announce loss of control and inform
personnel to stay clear of the air vehicle’s
descend path
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode for
controlled non power manual landing via
FPV

Severity
Health Cost

E

III

III

E

IV

IV

-Separate power supply to payload
subsystem to maintain FPV
Overall

E

III

Severity for complete failure of AP computer is accorded as category III due to possible risk to personnel safety if unaware
personnel did not get out of the landing path of the UAV. The severity to cost was also accorded as category III attributing to the
potential cost of property damage that the air vehicle may crash into as there is no mean to control the directions during the gliding
descend.
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Component: ESC
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Hazard
Causal factor

Effect
Immediate

Component
failure

-Loss of power to
motor

Erratic power
supply

Intermittent
failure

-ESC does not send
correct power to
motor

Run away
power supply

ESC internal
short circuit

-Surge in power
supply exceed motor
rated limit and melts
magnetic coil

System
-Aircraft enters into an
non-power and uncontrolled descend
-Fluctuating air speed
resulting to fluctuating
lift as AP constantly
corrects for prescribed
altitude
-Loss of motor resulting
to loss of lift

Severity
Health Cost

Mitigation

Prob

Design
-Switch to manual backup mode for
controlled non power manual landing via FPV

E

III

IV

Design
-Switch to manual backup mode for
controlled non power manual landing via FPV

E

IV

IV

Design
-Power module to limit maximum current
to ESC

E

IV

IV

Overall

E

III

Severity for complete failure of ESC is accorded as category III due to possible risk to personnel safety if unaware
personnel did not get out of the landing path of the UAV.

Component: BEC
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Hazard
Causal factor
Component
failure

Effect
Immediate
-Loss of power to
AP computer

System
-Aircraft enters into an
non-power and uncontrolled descend with
servos fixed in the last
position prior to loss of AP

Mitigation

Prob

Design
-Dual power supply to AP computer
Overall
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E

E

Severity
Health Cost

IV

IV

IV

Component: Mission Planning Software
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Effect
Causal factor

Component failure

Immediate
-Loss of mission
planning
capability,
telemetry

System
-Loss of mission
planning capability
and telemetry
display at GS

Mitigation

Prob

Procedure
-Program switch to initiate return to
launch site on manual RC controller
Overall

E

Severity
Health Cost
IV

IV

E

IV

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Component: Manual RC Controller
Hazard
Mode
Loss of
component
function

Effect
Causal factor

Component failure

Immediate
-Manual backup
mode

System
-No effect in
autonomous mode

Mitigation
Procedure
-Initiate return to launch site in
autonomous mode

E
Overall

IV

IV

E

IV

Prob

Severity
Health Cost

Component: Laptop
Hazard
Mode

Loss of
component
function

Effect
Causal factor

Component failure

Immediate
-Loss of mission
planning
capability,
telemetry and
image display at
GS

System

-Loss of mission
planning capability,
telemetry and image
display at GS

Mitigation
Design
-Switch to manual backup mode for
controlled non power manual landing via
FPV

E
-OSD to provide telemetry display on
FPV image
Overall
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IV

IV

-Separate monitor to display FPV image

E

IV

Appendix B: Setup for Pixhawk Autopilot Computer (ArduPilot, nd)

Several features and fail-safe functions on the “Pixhawk Autopilot” were utilized
to mitigate the risks identified in the FMECA. The fail-safes applied were 1) Throttle
Fail-Safe, 2) GS Fail-Safe, 3) Battery Fail-Safe and 4) GPS Fail-Safe. Features of
“Pixhawk Autopilot” employed in the architecture include geo-fence and dual power
capability.
The fail-safes were invoked by setting the necessary parameters in the
configuration through the “Mission Planner”. Configuration setting of the fail-safe is
carried out in the “Advance Params” function found under “Configuration” in the toolbar.
It is to note that different versioning of the “Mission Planner” has different Graphic User
Interface. In this research, “Mission Planner” version 1.3.24 was used.
1. Fail-Safe Action
The various types of fail-safe mention above will conclude into different
predefined actions after it has been triggered. The actions for the individual fail-safe
differs from each other, some only have a single action, while others may have a series of
actions depending on how the parameters are configured.
Fail-safes that have a series of action have two modes of responses. These are
configured into the “Pixhawk Autopilot” as “FS_SHORT_ACTN” (Short Fail-Safe
Response) and “FS_LONG_ACTN” (Long Fail-Safe Response). Each mode of response
will maintain a duration based on the value specified in “FS_SHORT_TIMEOUT” and
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“FS_LONG_TIMEOUT” before concluding its predefined action. The table below
summaries the description of the two modes of responses used in the architecture.
Table 22: Summary of Fail-Safe Response
Mode

Parameter Name
FS_SHORT_TIMEOUT

Short Fail-Safe
Response
FS_SHORT_ACTN

Value
“1.5”
“0”
“1”
“2”

FS_LONG_TIMEOUT
Long Fail-Safe
Response
FS_LONG-ACTN

“20”
“0”
“1”
“2”

Action Description
-Duration of failure associated with mode of failsafe before “Short Fail-Safe Response” is initiated.
-Default 1.5 second is used for the architecture
Nil (Disabled)
Circle in current location
Glide Landing with zero throttle setting and servo
deflection
-Duration of failure associated with mode of failsafe before “Long Fail-Safe Response” is initiated.
-Default 20 second is reduced for the architecture
Nil (Disabled)
Return to launch location
Glide Landing with zero throttle setting and servo
deflection

2. Throttle Fail-Safe
Throttle input controls the rotational speed of the electrical motor which in turn
determines the amount of thrust generated by the propeller. This input is sent from the
RC console to the onboard AP computer as a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) signal
where higher throttle input relates to higher PWM frequency. On board the air vehicle,
the AP computer interprets the PWM frequency and translates it into corresponding
current amperage for the motor.
Throttle Fail-Safe is activated when the received PWM frequency by the AP
computer is lower than the predefined frequency at the minimum throttle input. This
situation occurs when there is a component failure in the RC subsystem or when the air
vehicle exceeded the transmission range of the RC transceivers. It is to note that the RC
controller will generate an audio warning when the received signal strength reached the
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preset low threshold as the air vehicle operates near its maximum transmission range or
in the presence of interference.
Throttle fail-Safe is enabled when the “THR_FAILSAFE” parameter is set as “1”
and is triggered when the PWM frequency drops below the “THR_FS_VALUE”
parameter. The value input for the “THR_FS_VALUE” parameter must be lower than the
frequency when the throttle is at the minimum position. For the “Taranis” RC controller
used in this research, the associated “THR_FS_VALUE” value is set below 925.
The fail-safe action will depend on how the two modes of response are
configured; see previous section on Fail Safe Action. Depending on the configured
parameter, “FS_SHORT_ACTN’ (Short Fail-Safe Response) will be invoked when the
duration of the associated fault exceeds the value for “FS_SHORT_TIMEOUT”. As the
fault persists beyond the value set for “FS_LONG_TIMEOUT”, the “FS_LONG_ACTN’
(Long Fail-Safe Response) will be initiated. See Figure 33 for the sequence of the
Throttle Fail-Safe Response.
The contingency procedure mentioned Figure 33 is to initiate “Autonomous
mode” through the GS and input a command to launch return the UAV back to the launch
site. With a loss in function of the RC console, the safety pilot cannot land the UAV
manually. This will be replaced by an autonomous landing that is activated through the
GS.
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Figure 33: Sequence of Throttle Fail-Safe Response
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3. GS Fail-Safe
Telemetry protocol message is continuously transmitted from the GS to the air
vehicle. The AP computer will interpret a loss of communication link with the GS if there
is protocol message is not received. When the value of “FS_GCS_ENABLE” parameter
is set to “1”, GS Fail-Safe is enabled. The response of the GS Fail-safe is similar to the
Throttle Fail-safe and will depend on the Fail-safe action defined in Section 1 of this
appendix. However, the contingency procedure for the GS Fail-safe is different from the
Throttle Fail-safe. For GS Fail-safe, the Safety pilot will select “Manual mode” or
“Stabilized mode” from the RC console and land the aircraft manually.
4. Battery Fail-Safe
Battery Fail-Safe triggers a return to launch site when the voltage or current drops
below the values specified in the parameter configuration for the main power bus to the
AP computer. The parameters associated with this function are “FS_BATT_VOLTAGE”
and “FS_BATT_MAH” with default values set as “0” which disable the fail-safes.
Changing the parameter to the desired values will enable the fail-safe function. The unit
of measure associated with “FS_BATT_VOLTAGE” is in volt and “FS_BATT_MAH” is
in mAH.
5. GPS Fail-Safe
GPS Fail-Safe can only be set up after enabling the Advance Fail Safe function of
the “Pixhawk autopilot”. The Advance Fail Safe is enabled by setting the
“AFS_ENABLE” parameter to ‘1’. The GPS fail safe will be triggered if GPS lock is loss
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for more than 3 seconds and will return to the waypoint number that was specified in the
“AFS_WP_GPS_LOSS” parameter. For example, when the parameter is set to ‘5’ the
UAV will return to the number 5 waypoint that was set in the mission plan.
Thereafter, the UAV will loiter above the way point. If GPS link is restored, the
UAV will resume its mission. However if the GPS link is not restored after 30 second,
the AP computer will stop the mission and return the UAV to the launch site.
It is to note that the GPS Fail-safe has an association with GS Fail-safe. In the
event that GS link with the UAV is loss together with the GPS link, the AP computer will
terminate the operation by setting the throttle to zero and deflects all control surface to
maximum. This will result to the UAV spiraling to the ground.
6. Geo-fencing
There are two modes of activation for the Geo-fence. The first mode is via a RC
channel input with a PWM value above 1,750. This PWM signal must be maintain
throughout the entire duration when the fence is activated. The second mode of activation
is via the parameter “FENCE_AUTOENABLE”. When set to the value of ‘1’, the Geofence will be automatically enabled after an autonomous take-off.
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Appendix C: Source Reference for Components in Architecture

Battery Sizing
Preliminary sizing of the battery for a system endurance of 0.5 hr was conducted to
allocate suitable costing for the various power supplies for the sub-systems. The ‘Usable
Energy’ of a battery will depend on the ‘Battery Efficiency’ and ‘Usable Factor’ which
are typically 0.8 (Gundlach, 1975:72).

Energy battery = Capacity * Voltage * n battery * f usable

(8)

Payload Battery
Table 23: Calculated Payload Battery Consumption
Component
Transmitter
Camera
OSD

Voltage (V)
3.7 – 5
5 - 12
5

Current (mA)
500
700
500
Total

Power Required = Voltage * Current (mW)
2,500
8,400
2,500
13,400 mW

Battery usable = Capacity * n battery * f usable
= 1,300 * 0.8 * 0.8
= 832 mAhr

(9)

From Equation (8), the usable battery capacity is derived to give Equation (9). A 3
cell Lithium Polymer (LiPo) battery with output voltage of 11.1 V and capacity of 1,300
mAhr was selected. From Equation (9), the battery ‘Usable Capacity’ is derived at 832
mAhr. The total capacity current required by the payload sub-system from the battery is
121

1,207 mA (

13,400 W
11.1 V

). Hence, with 832 mAh ‘Usable Capacity’, the endurance for the

Payload sub-system is 0.69 hr.
Motor Battery
The capacity of the primary battery is determined by numerous factors. These
include duration of the mission, motor size, flight profile of the UAV, take-off weight,
transceiver transmission power and wind condition. From earlier research efforts, four 6
cell batteries were arranged in parallel, each with a pair of battery in series was used to
power the “SIG rascal 110”. Each battery is 22.2 V and carries a capacity of 5,000 mA.
A 20 minutes flight was achieved with 10,000 mA at 44.4 V at the end of the test.
However, the specific utilization rate was not documented. The same battery
configuration was retained but in the new architecture, it is only powering the motor and
not the entire UAV. From Chapter 5, the average consumption rate for the motor bus was
10,982 mA per hour. The selected battery configuration is expected to have an excess of
45% capacity to support a 0.5 hr flight. Factoring for battery usable capacity, the
configuration would still have an excess of 9% capacity after a 0.5 hr flight.
Avionics Battery
The avionics battery supplies power the AP computer, which in turn powers the
servos, transceivers and GPS. In the event of a loss in propulsion, the operator will switch
to ‘Manual Mode’ and glide the UAV to a clear location for landing. The current
consumption of the avionics is relatively small compared to the motor. To reduce
diversity in parts, the same 3 cell LiPo battery (11.1 V, 1,300 mAhr) selected for the
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payload sub-system were used to power the avionics system. Similar to the motor battery,
the utilization rate will be measured in Chapter 5 to verify adequacy of the capacity.
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Table 24: Source Reference for Components in Architecture
S/N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Description
Sig Rascal 110
Servo
Motor (HimaxHC6332-230
Brushless Electric Motor)
Propeller (APC 19x10E)
Anti Spark (50 Ohm resistor)
Arming Switch
ESC (120 A)
PM (45 V)

9

Pixhawk Autopilot computer

10

Telemetry Transmitter (RFD
900+ modem)
Telemetry Antenna
(900MHz)
RC Transceiver (2.4 GHz)
Video transmitter (Aomway
5.8 GHz TX 1000)
BEC
Diode
GPS/Magnetic Compass
Pitot-static Sensor
OSD

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Camera (Hack HD camera
PCB)

Reference website
http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html
comes with air vehicle
http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html
http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html
Consumable hardware - negligible cost
http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html
http://www.castlecreations.com/products/phoenix-edge-lite-hv.html
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__56855__HKPilot_Mega_10s_Power_Module_With_X
T60_Connectors.html
https://store.3drobotics.com/products/3drpixhawk/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=branded&utm_campaign=branded&gcl
id=CPWikYGcuMYCFVU6gQodTpkJUg
http://store.jdrones.com/RDF900_Telemetry_Modem_p/rdf900mdm1.htm
https://store.3drobotics.com/products/antenna-900mhz-rp-sma-2dbi?taxon_id=34
http://www.multiwiicopter.com/products/frsky-l9r-long-range-taranis-rx
http://www.fpvmodel.com/aomway-5-8g-1000mw-a-v-1w-transmitter-5-8g-32ch-receiver-built-indvr-for-fpv_g602.html
https://store.3drobotics.com/products/apm-power-module-with-xt60-connectors?taxon_id=34
Consumable hardware - negligible cost
https://store.3drobotics.com/products/3dr-gps-ublox-with-compass
https://store.3drobotics.com/products/pixhawk-airspeed-sensor-kit?taxon_id=34
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__80102__Minim_OSD_for_APM_or_Pixhawk_Flight_
Controllers.html
http://hackhd.com/
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S/N
20

Description
Voltage regulator (5 V)

21

Battery (Motor - 6 cell
5,000mAh )
Battery (Avionics - 3 cell
1,300mAh)

22
23

Battery (Payload - 3 cell 1,300mAh)

Reference website
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__41922__Blue_Arrow_Ultra_Micro_Automatic_Voltag
e_Regulator_5V_1A_DC_Output.html
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__9176__Turnigy_5000mAh_6S_20C_Lipo_Pack.html
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__11903__Turnigy_nano_tech_1300mah_3S_25_50C_L
ipo_Pack.html
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__11903__Turnigy_nano_tech_1300mah_3S_25_50C_L
ipo_Pack.html
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